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ABSTRACT
Traditional way to detect malicious software is based on signature matching. However,
signature matching only detects known malicious software. In order to detect unknown
malicious software, it is necessary to analyze the software for its impact on the system when
the software is executed. In one approach, the software code can be statically analyzed
for any malicious patterns. Another approach is to execute the program and determine
the nature of the program dynamically. Since the execution of malicious code may have
negative impact on the system, the code must be executed in a controlled environment.
For that purpose, we have developed a sandbox to protect the system. Potential malicious
behavior is intercepted by hooking Win32 system calls.
Using the developed sandbox, we detect unknown virus using dynamic instruction se-
quences mining techniques. By collecting runtime instruction sequences in basic blocks, we
extract instruction sequence patterns based on instruction associations. We build classifica-
tion models with these patterns. By applying this classification model, we predict the nature
of an unknown program. We compare our approach with several other approaches such as
simple heuristics, NGram and static instruction sequences.
We have also developed a method to identify a family of malicious software utilizing the
system call trace. We construct a structural system call diagram from captured dynamic
system call traces. We generate smart system call signature using profile hidden Markov
model (PHMM) based on modularized system call block. Smart system call signature weakly
identifies a family of malicious software.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Malicious software is becoming a major threat to the computer world. The general
availability of the malicious software programming skill and malicious code authoring tools
makes it easier to build new malicious codes. In 2008, the number of new malicious code
signatures increased by 265 percent over 2007; over 60 percent of all currently detected
malicious code threats were detected in 2008 [1]. Moreover, the advent of more sophisticated
virus writing techniques such as polymorphism [2] and metamorphism [3] makes it even
harder to detect a virus.
The prevailing technique in the anti-virus industry is based on signature matching. The
detection mechanism searches for a signature pattern that identifies a particular virus or
strain of viruses. Though accurate in detecting known viruses, the technique falls short for
detecting new or unknown viruses for which no identifying pattern is present. Whenever a
new virus comes into the wild, virus experts extract identifying byte sequences of that virus
either manually or automatically [4], then deliver the fingerprint of the new virus through
an automatic update process. The end user will finally get the fingerprint and be able to
scan for the new viruses.
However, zero-day attacks are not uncommon these days [5]. These zero-day viruses
propagate fast and cause catastrophic damage to the computers before the new identifying
fingerprint is distributed.
Furthermore, polymorphic and metamorphic viruses change their appearance every time
they propagate. The signature generated for one virus copy may not capture other virus
copies.
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Several approaches have been proposed to detect unknown virus without signatures.
These approaches can be further divided into two categories: static approaches and dynamic
approaches. Static approaches check executable binary or assembly code derived from the
executable without executing it. Detecting virus from binary code is semantic agnostic and
may not capture the key component of virus code. Static approaches based on assembly code
seems to be promising, however, deriving assembly code from an executable itself is a hard
problem. In our experiment, we find that approximately 90% of virus binary code cannot
be fully disassembled by state of art disassembler. Dynamic approaches are to actually run
the executables and capture the runtime behavior.
1.2 Dynamic Instruction Sequences Approach Overview
Most existing dynamic approaches are based on system calls made by the unknown
executable at runtime. The idea behind is that viral behavior of a malicious code is revealed
by system calls. However, some malicious code will not reveal itself by making such system
calls in every invocation of the virus code. On the other hand, some malicious behaviors
such as self-modifying are not revealed through system calls. Based on these observations,
we propose to use dynamic instruction sequences instead of system calls to detect virus
dynamically.
One approach to detect unknown virus automatically is to use heuristic rules based on
expert knowledge [6]. Although this approach is widely adopted by commercial anti-virus
software, it is easier to be evaded by the virus writers once the rules are known to them. The
other approach is data mining. Data mining refers to the process to prepare, transform, and
discover useful knowledge from data automatically [7]. In our context, it is a classification
problem to determine whether a program can be classified into either malicious or benign.
The key problem for this classification problem is how to extract features from captured
runtime instruction sequences. We use the information how instructions group together to
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capture the nature of malicious behavior. To this end, we devise a notion called instruction
association.
In the first step, we organize instructions into logic assembly. Logic assembly is a re-
constructed program assembly using available runtime instruction sequences. It may have
incomplete code coverage, but logic assembly will keep the structure of the executable code.
In addition, the process of logic assembly construction handles the self-modifying code in a
normal way.
The second step is to extract frequent instruction groups inside basic blocks within logic
assembly. We call these instruction groups “instruction associations”. We use three varia-
tions of instruction associations. The first is the instruction association that observes which
instructions appear together in a block but does not consider the order. Second, we consider
the order of the instructions in a block but not necessarily consecutive. Third, we consider
the exact consecutive order of instructions in a block.
We use the relative frequency of instruction association as features of our dataset. We
then build classification models based on the dataset.
While accuracy is the main focus for virus detection, efficiency is another concern. No
matter how accurate the detection mechanism is, if it takes long time to determine if an
executable is a virus or not, it is not useful in practice. We log the first several thousand
dynamic instructions of an unknown program. We believe the initial part of a virus and a
benign code is quite different. Our analysis shows that compared to system calls, our ap-
proach takes less time to collect enough data for the classification model, and the subsequent
calculation time is affordable.
1.3 Structural System Call Diagram Approach Overview
Most existing dynamic malicious software detection approaches are using system call
traces. System call trace contains important information about the behavior of a program,
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however, system call trace is chronological logs with repetitions. It is hard and time con-
suming to read.
Structural system call diagram is an approach to address this problem. We construct
a control flow graph like structure to visualize the execution flow of the system call trace.
With the help of structural system call diagram, it is much easier to analyze the behavior of
the program.
Structural system call diagram also provides a natural boundary of system calls. Using
this system call boundary, we are able to identify a distinctive system call signature to capture
a family of malicious software. We can derive the system call signature either manually or
automatically. We do not require exact match, we allow insertion, deletion and mutation of
any system calls within this system call signature.
1.4 Dissertation Organization
In the rest of dissertation, we first provide background of this research in chapter 2, then
describe dynamic execution environment in chapter 3, present dynamic instruction sequence
approach in chapter 4, structural system call diagram approach in chapter 5, and present
our conclusion in chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
2.1 Malicious Software
Malicious software is a software written purposefully to perform unwanted actions to
the authorized computer users. The exact action malicious software performing evolves
over time. In the early years, the unwanted actions could be some simple pranks, such as
displaying message “catch me if you can!”. Later on, many malicious softwares are designed
to destroy end user’s computer, such as formatting the hard drive or deleting crucial system
files. Current trend for malicious code is to perform criminal actions such as steal user’s
private information or use one’s computer as a zombie to attack other computers. Some
software are written in good intention in mind, such as patch the computer against certain
system vulnerability. But as long as it is not the intention of the end user, it is generally
considered as malicious software as well.
Malicious software is a collective notion. It can be further divided into several categories.
Different categories may overlap each other.
Computer virus is the first kind of malicious software ever written. Computer virus is
characterized by the ability to infect other executable files. Computer virus do not prop-
agate automatically. Typically virus code propagates when user execute a malicious code
inadvertently. Nowadays, these malicious codes typically come with email attachments.
Malicious software can also propagate totally unnoticed by the user by exploiting system
vulnerabilities. We call this type of malicious software worm. Network service vulnerabilities
are the most common threats. “Code Red” [8] exploits a vulnerability in IIS web server.
“Klez” worm [9] propagates via email. Different from email virus which requires user in-
teraction, “Klez” worm exploits a vulnerability [10] in Outlook Express and will execute
automatically without explicitly opening the email attachment by the user. “Nimaya” [11]
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is able to propagate by simply inserting an infected flash memory into the victim computer
without any other additional actions by the user.
Trojan horse [6] is memory resident malicious software. Once infected, the victim com-
puter opens up one or several control ports for intruders to control certain part of the
computer behavior. Trojan horse can either passively listens to the open ports and waits
for the instructions from the intruder (backdoors), or actively collects information on the
victim’s computer and sends it out to the intruders. Keylogger is a special type of trojan
horse that records user’s key strokes stealthily and sends them back to the intruders. Key
strokes may contain valuable information such as password and credit card number.
Macro virus [6] is characterized by the type of code it utilizes. Instead of binary code,
Macro virus is coded using Macro language provided by application software such as Mi-
crosoft Word. A big install base of these application software make Macro virus be able to
run on a thousands of millions computers.
Spyware [6] is installed together with legal software without user’s notice. Spyware do not
propagate automatically and do not infect other system files. They abuse the user consent
on the legal software they want to install. Once installed, Spyware collects user’s privacy
information such as online behavior and sends back to the designated agents.
Rootkit [12] is characterized by its extreme stealth. Rootkit modifies part of operating
system files to conceal its files, processes and registry entries. Conventional techniques cannot
detect the presence of the rootkit because of invisibility of the trace of rootkit. The focus of
rootkit research is to reveal the presence of a rootkit.
Botnet [13] is characterized by infecting a large number of computers into zombies to form
a malicious network. The term botnet refers to the whole malicious network. Each victim
computer is called a bot. Botnet is frequently used to send spam emails [14] and launch
DDos attack. Usually the number of bots consisting a botnet is around several hundred to
several thousand [15]. A smaller number of bots is harder to detect and still powerful to
be useful to the botnet owner. The focus of botnet research is to turn down the existing
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botnet rather than defend against the bot code to be installed on end user computers. The
installation process of bots is similar to those of worms.
The classification of malicious software mentioned above is not mutually exclusive. Some
malicious software can sit on two or more categories. Bots which forms a botnet usually
propagates by exploiting a system vulnerability which makes them also computer worms.
Some advanced worms conceal themselves using rootkit techniques, which makes them both
worm and rootkit.
2.2 Conventional Malicious Software Detection Techniques
Conventional malicious software detection relies on signature matching [6]. The detection
mechanism searches for a signature pattern that identifies a particular virus or a strain of
viruses.
Simple signature figure 2.1 is a byte sequence requiring exact match against virus code.
Short signature results a high false positive rate. False positive rate is the proportion of
benign executables that were erroneously reported as being malicious. A high false positive
rate is very annoying to the user. However, long signature can be very restrictive that can
only capture one particular malicious code not even its closest relatives.
Wildcard signature figure 2.1 is more flexible than simple signature in that they are
able to catch a family of malicious code. Wildcard signature contains special “wildcard”
character that capture any character. The mechanism is similar to Unix filename wildcard.
With wildcard signature, we are able to capture invariant part of a family of malicious code.
However, wildcard signature is much slower than the simple signature.
Signature of malicious software can be derived either manually or automatically. When
a new malicious software comes into wide, computer security expert analyzes the malicious
code and find out a unique feature of it. With the domain knowledge, security expert
can find near optimal signature of the malicious code. However, this approach is costly
7
Figure 2.1: Virus Signature
and slow. When the outbreak of the malicious software becomes faster and faster, security
experts are becoming overwhelmingly busy. An alternative approach is to extract signature
automatically [4]. This approach relies on maintaining a benign signature database. For
every malicious software, a random signature is generated and then compared with benign
signature database to ensure that no benign program contains that byte sequence.
Signature database for malicious software is a critical asset for an anti-virus company.
It is usually a well guarded secret and not available to general public. However, some open
source anti-virus software do open its signature database. ClamAV [16] is one of the most
popular open source anti-virus software, and its signature database is available to public. At
the time this thesis is written, there are 513,978 malicious software signatures in its database
and this number is keep increasing. ClamAV signature support wildcard character “?” and
“*”, the meaning of both characters are similar to those in Unix wildcard. The length of the
signature varies and most signatures are longer than 100 bytes to avoid false positive. All
signatures are intended to capture only one malicious code rather than a family. Table 2.1
illustrates some of the signatures inside the ClamAV signature database.
A constant update of the signature database is essential to make it possible to capture
latest malicious code. There is certainly a time gap between the outbreak of a malicious
code and the availability of its signature. This gap often creates problem because by the
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Table 2.1: ClamAV Database Sample
Trojan.Pakes-17 363e0380085a21b6b3e2e5f9f945a6aba3d9232
3820d488a220622589ceab79fbd9209c564b5b3
230082d8c69d02806400468503b78122222621f
8bcb0f9dd510000f8eeaa173cec93ee9ce87409
80ca1e5d0e44ba269134375c244108497583c46
71c586540e0f2d1e441120ab53354e7667f28c0
e45075a99ade135960a47b
Trojan.Win32.Rootkit d3001110010e68026e81887f2e2bf6ff7984881
de4b73371205cb518d46000857e6bb5da517a0e
a53b38df5f5a800e06852f1b0fe627d85452881
fc3034dc2180b961bbfc7231006176462c01396
24f9b6a6e21fa188903100e53c9c60e51c6edc4
74b68261c0c6f0d84e061095809eaeb1907c448
61e951a8bb340041e39196
JS.Feebs.Y 6c616e67756167653d{-1}6a617661736372697
074{3-6}3d22*3d756e65736361706528{-4}29
3b{-25}3b6576616c28{-4}293b{-4}3d2228??
223b??28{-4}293b3c2f736372
Trojan.Downloader.Small-1170 3005723d25640c0826092ea489c3034d414a914
845d544c2275680525920423a4947265ad49c4d
433a294c4f950318776a74974a036720c36d6e7
602ab5cfb7273aeeb57
Trojan.Downloader.Small-1171 6b68626073686e6d725b4b687273000000003b2
b3b464f42434d46453b31000000005a65726174
756c2e20427261737361692073
Email.Phishing.Pay-4 496620796f7520646f6e??74206167726565207
769746820746869732065{-1}6d61696c20616e
6420696620796f75206e6565642061737369737
4616e6365207769746820796f7572206163{-28
}61737465207468652066616c6c6f77696e6720
{3-4}20696e20796f757220(69|49)6e7465
HTML.Phishing.Bank-379 6c6f67206f6666206166746572207573696e672
0796f7572206f6e6c696e65206163636f756e74
3c2f6469763e3c6469763e{-7}636c69636b207
4686520666f6c6c6f77696e67206c696e6b2c20
746f2076657269667920796f7572206163636f7
56e742061637469766974793a3c2f64
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time a massive outbreak could already happen. For every unknown malicious code, there
will be such a gap. Even for a variation of known malicious code, existing signature fails.
Creating a variation of known malicious code is easy. Manually, malicious software writer
can change some part of the source code to create a new virus code. As long as the captured
signature of old malicious code changes, the new variation will penetrate the protection of
existing anti-virus software. Although signature database of most anti-virus software is not
open, virus writer can test this new binary code against existing anti-virus software to make
sure the new code will not be captured by existing malicious software database. If none of
existing anti-virus software captures it, the virus writer can launch a zero-day attack again
easily.
Another way to create a variation of an existing malicious software is through polymor-
phism [2] and metamorphism [3]. Polymorphism is a self-encrypted code with a unique
encryption key embed for each malicious software copy. The initial part of the execution
decrypt the encrypted code using the embed encryption key. Each time malicious code infect
other file, it changes its encryption key to make a complete different copy. Only the initial
decryption code is the same for all those copies, and these invariant codes are the key to
detect a polymorphic malicious code. Metamorphism on the other hand, do not encrypt
the code. It replaces the original codes with equivalent but transformed codes. The tech-
niques for metamorphic code include code swap, redundant code injection, etc. This impose
a challenge to the malicious software writer. They need to reorganize the malicious code
as they propagate. However, it is a greater challenge for security expert. No part of the
malicious code is reliable to detect all variations of the metamorphic code. There are several
efforts aim to deal with metamorphism [17,18,19,20]. However, no general solution has been
invented yet.
All above mentioned approaches: constant code rewriting, polymorphism and metamor-
phism impose a great challenge for the signature based detection mechanism. The effort to
10
derive a new signature is much more than the effort to create a new malicious code variation.
To cope with this, a different mechanism to detect unknown malicious code is highly desired.
One promising research area is smarter virus signature. In addition to wildcard signa-
tures, Brumley et al [21] experiment Turing machine signatures, Symbolic constraint signa-
tures and regular expression signatures.
In [22, 23], the authors use binary as their features and derive a profile hidden Markov
model from a family of computer viruses. They use the profile hidden Markov model as
a signature to score an unknown executable to determine the nature of the unknown exe-
cutable.
Smarter signature relax the constraint of the virus signature. However, the basic problem
of signature still exists. If the new variation is very different or the virus comes from another
computer virus family, smarter virus signatures fail as well.
2.3 Detecting Unknown malicious software
Although the problem of determining whether an unknown software is malicious or not
has been proven to be generally undecidable [24], detecting malicious software with an ac-
ceptable detecting rate is still possible. A number of approaches have been proposed to
detect unknown malicious software. Here we discuss the approaches to detect Win32 com-
puter viruses only.
2.3.1 Heuristics
Unlike conventional programming, virus code need to inject its code into existing program
without the support of a compiler. Some unique problem need to be solved by the virus
writer.
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(i) Consistency of Win32 executable head. For a conventional program, compiler and
linker will generate correct Win32 executable head structure. Every Win32 executable
consists of a head followed by several sections of code and data. The head contains meta
data for the executable and each individual section. It also contains import table and
export table for the executable. Pietrek describe Win32 head structure in detail [25,26].
A virus, however, injects its code into the victim executable, the consistency of the
victim executable head is compromised. Virus writer should adjust the Win32 head of
the victim executable carefully to correct those inconsistency.
(ii) Placement of code. It is hard to move existing code inside victim executable around.
So the easiest and most popular strategy is to add the virus code in the end. That is,
append to the last section of the code or create a new section in the end.
(iii) Self relocation. A large amount of instructions take absolute values of virtual memory
address as their operands. However, virtual memory address of a program is determined
at runtime by the program loader. The relocation table within executable file will
point to those operands and the value of these operands will be adjusted when loading.
Injected virus code lacks the support of relocation table and virtual addresses inside
virus code cannot be adjusted at load time. Virus writers have two choices to deal
with this problem. Either do not use absolute addressing at all, or manipulate the
relocation table when injecting the virus code. The former approach is much easier
and popular. The idea is to use some special instruction sequences to get PC address
of the current instruction. For the afterward access to the virtual memory address, use
relative address instead of absolute value. Figure 2.2 illustrate a self relocation code
snippet.
(iv) Locate Win32 API call. All destructive actions of a virus are performed through Win32
API calls. Win32 API calls are provided by system DLLs. AWin32 program can invoke
a Win32 API call dynamically or statically. Static approach utilizes the DLL entries
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Figure 2.2: Self Relocation Code
information in the import table in PE head. However, there is no guarantee that the
Win32 API the virus required is already in the PE head and it is hard to modify
the import table. An easier solution is to use dynamic DLL call. However, two DLL
invocations are required to perform an arbitrary dynamic dll call, “LoadLibrary” and
“GetProcAddress”. These two API calls are inside “kernel32.dll”. The base address
for module “kernel32.dll” differs even if the minor versions of the Windows operating
system are different. Virus writers usually do a memory search to find “kernel32.dll”,
and get the virtual address for these two system APIs.
To detect unknown Win32 viruses, simple heuristics is one frequently used approach by
commercial anti-virus software. It is based on invariant parts of a computer virus. [6]
describes many heuristics to detect Win32 viruses.
A well structured binary code is usually compact. So it is hard for a virus to insert
its code between sections. Most viruses choose to insert their code into the last section or
append a new section to the victim binary, both of which can be extended almost unlimitedly.
Once they have appended the viral code, they also change the program entry point to the
newly added viral code. The result is that the entry point points to the last section of the
executable binary. It is totally legal and some compilers will generate executable binary
share this character. However, most compilers put all executable codes into “.text” section,
and “.text” section rarely located in the last section. The fact that entry point points to the
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last section by itself is not obvious enough to tell malicious code from benign. However, this
is an important clue if combined with other observations.
Another strategy used by virus writers is to inject virus code into the holes between
neighboring sections. Each hole is small, but by combining several holes, it could be large
enough to fit all code of a virus. Virus code uses control flow transfer instructions to glue
each small part together. It is more difficult to write this kind of virus code but it is a more
stealthy way in that entry point do not need to be in the last section. A heuristic to detect
such phenomena is to get the percentage of occupation for the last blocks of every section.
If last blocks of all sections are very full, then this executable binary code is suspicious.
Each section has a section name. Most compiler will use some well defined section names
such as “.text” or “.code” for instructions, “.data” for global variables, “.bss” for uninitialized
variables, etc. Although users are able to override these default settings, it is not common for
most of programs. That makes section name another heuristics to detect unknown viruses.
Size consistency is a heuristics based on the correctness of section size calculation. For
a well-formed executable file, the size field in PE head should equal to the aggregate of the
size all sections of the executable plus the size of the PE head. However, virus code may
skip the size calculation and leaves an inconsistent PE head.
To solve the problem of self-relocation, virus frequently use “call next address” operation
(See figure 2.2) in the beginning of virus body. This operation is meaningless in regular
program. The hex representation for this operation is “E800000000”. Existence of such
bytes is another important heuristics in detecting Win32 virus.
Memory search for “PE” and “kernel32.dll” is suspicious because it is a mechanism
frequently used by virus to locate “LoadLibrary” and “GetProcAddress” Win32 API. Legit-
imated programs do not need to do that because they can use these functions directly with
the support of a compiler and linker.
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However, heuristics is becoming less effective in detecting new generation of computer
viruses. Once known to the virus writers, these simple heuristics can be easily avoided as
follows.
(i) Consistency of executable is not a hard problem to solve. Virus writer should be more
careful to adjust all fields in Win32 head.
(ii) Entry point obscuring (EPO) [27] technology makes code placement heuristics less
effective. With EPO, virus code is still placed in the end of the executable, however,
entry point is located in other location in the executable other than the virus code.
A control flow transfer instruction will be placed near the entry point to divert the
execution of the code to the virus code. With such an arrangement, entry point is not
necessarily to be placed in the last section.
(iii) Self-relocation seems to be unavoidable in an executable. However, most executables
do not need relocation and there is no relocation table inside executable. Relocation
process is usually used by dynamic linked library. It is guaranteed that executable file
module is the first module to be loaded into the process address space. So executable
is always granted the preferred base address and there is no need to relocate. Without
relocation, it is much easier for a virus to calculate the virtual address operands of an
instruction. And because of this, self-relocation code becomes unnecessary.
(iv) API locating operation is unavoidable. However, there could be a huge variation for
API locating code and capture these code is not easy. The conventional way is to check
the string “PE” and “kernel32.dll” for which the virus code is searching. However, using
simple string encryption hides the string and compromises this heuristics.
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2.3.2 Research Domain
There are other approaches in the research domain which go beyond simple heuristics.
We can divide them into static approaches and dynamic approaches.
Static approaches check executable binaries or assembly codes without actually executing
the unknown program.
Weber et al [28] develop a Portable Executable Analysis Tool (PEAT) system that is
basically a GUI tool to assist virus researchers to identify computer viruses. It first checks
the consistency of PE header, and then presents key statistics such as instruction frequencies,
call distances, together with byte-type view, ASCII view and other views to the end user.
End users need their own experience to judge if the executable is a virus using the provided
statistics on the given program.
The work of Arnold et al [29] uses binary trigram as their detecting criteria. They use
neural network as their classifier and reported a good result in detecting boot sector viruses
for a small sample size.
InSeon et al [30] also use binary sequences as features. However, they construct a self or-
ganizing map on top of these features. Self organizing map converts binary sequences into a
two dimensional map. They claim that malicious viruses from the same virus family demon-
strate the same characteristic in the resulting graph. But they do not give a quantitative
way to differentiate a virus from benign code.
Schultz et al [31] use comprehensive features in their classifiers. They use three groups of
features. The first group is the list of DLLs and DLL function calls used by the binary. The
second group is string information acquired from GNU strings utility. The third group is a
simple binary sequence feature. They conducted experimentation using numerous classifiers
such as RIPPER, Naive Bayes and Multi-Naive Bayes.
In recent years, researchers start to explore the possibility to use N-Gram in detecting
computer viruses [32, 33, 34]. Here N-Gram refers to consecutive binary sequences of fixed
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of 8-Gram
size inside binary code. In binary executables, it stands for n consecutive binary sequences
as shown in figure 2.3.
Kolter et al [34] extract all N-Gram from a training set and then perform a feature
selection process based on information gain. Top 500 N-Gram features are selected. Then,
they mark the presence of each N-Gram in the training dataset. These binary tabular
data are used as the input data for numerous classifiers. They experimented with Instance-
based Learner, TFIDF classifier, Naive Bayes, Support Vector Machines, Decision Trees and
Boosted Classifiers. Instead of accuracy, they only reported AUC (Areas Under Curves).
The best result is achieved by boosted J48 at AUC, 0.996.
Although above approaches show satisfactory results, these detection techniques are lim-
ited in that they do not distinguish the instructions from data and are blind to the structure
of the program which carries important information to understand its behavior. We have
repeated the experiment mentioned in [34] and we have found that the key contributors that
lead to the classification are not from bytes which representing virus code, rather, they are
from structural binary or string constants.
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Table 2.2: Top 8-Gram
Benign
0000000000000000
0404040404040404
2000200020002000
0020002000200020
4040404040404040
ffffffffffffffff
cccccccccc8bff55
cccccccc8bff558b
cccccc8bff558bec
2020202020202020
Virus
0000000000000000
9090909090909090
5858585858585858
cccccccccccccccc
2a2a2a2a2a2a2a2a
2121212121212121
4142434441424344
4441424344414243
4344414243444142
4243444142434441
Table 2.2 lists top ten 8-Grams from both benign and malicious dataset. In the top
benign 8-Grams, the first six are only structural bytes which have nothing to do with in-
structions. Seventh to ninth 8-Grams are partial instructions and partial structural bytes.
Actually all three 8-Grams contain the same instruction sequences. This instruction se-
quences repeat three times with a slightly different window. The tenth 8-Gram contains
only string information. Binary “20” represents space in ASCII.
In the top virus 8-Grams, second and third 8-Gram could be instructions. “90” is
“nop”and “58” is “pop ax” in 80x86 instruction set. However, they are just “boring” in-
structions. The primary reason for virus writers to use these instructions is padding rather
than doing real stuff. Fifth to tenth 8-Grams are string information.
We examine many top N-Grams, and we find that most top N-Grams are not instructions.
They are either structural bytes or string information. Even if there are a few instructions,
most of them are “boring” instructions, such as “nop”, rather than critical instructions.
Most instruction N-Grams are actually the same instruction sequences repeated for many
times with a slightly different window.
Since structural binary and string constants are not essential components to a virus,
N-Gram detection mechanisms which are primarily based on these features can be evaded.
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Ye et al [35] uses the imported functions inside import table of an executable as main
criteria to detect viruses. They derive association rules by mining the combination of im-
ported functions for both virus and benign software. The major problem of this approach is
the ignorance of the virus codes which do not rely on import table entries. Many virus codes
load dynamic linked libraries dynamically and do not put Win32 API entries into import
table of the executable.
Another set of static approaches focus on higher level features which are constructed on
top of assembly code. Christodorescu et al [36] use template matching against assembly code
to detect known malicious behavior such as self-modification. In [37], the authors propose
to use control graph extracted from assembly code and then use graph comparing algorithm
to match it against known virus control graphs. Kinder et al [38] is also based on assembly
code. The authors first identify temporal dependencies among different instructions. Then
they generalize the dependencies into a formal specification. They present the specification
for CopySelf and ExecOpened behavior. Using a model checking algorithm, they can check
if a specific executable contains such temporal dependencies. Siddiqui et al [39] uses opcode
N-Gram based on disassembly code. This paper put more focus on statistical manipulation.
These approaches seem to be promising. The problem is that disassembling executable
code itself is a hard problem. The difficulty comes from two sources.
First, virus writers use some packers [40] to transform their binary code. Some virus
even pack its code several times to make it even harder to unpack. IDA-Pro [41] equipped
with a Universal PE Unpacker Plug-in [42] deals with packed code. This approach is fast,
however, to use this plug-in, user need to know the original entry point of the binary code.
This approach is specific to deal with certain packed code. Two other groups [43,44] describe
general frameworks to reveal unpacked code. The problem of both approaches are the poor
performance. Due to single step debugging mode, the execution is several magnitudes slower.
Further more, this method makes unpacking some binary code virtually impossible.
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Second, even if the program is not packed, disassembling is sometime still hard. The
problem is the control flow transfer destination obfustication, which makes it hard to deter-
mine the starting point for each new block. This problem is addressed by [45,46,47,48,49].
The authors give some heuristics to relieve the problem. However, no general solution has
been yet proposed for this problem.
Besides static analysis, dynamic approaches have also been used in virus research. Most
of current approaches are based on system calls collected from runtime.
TTAnalyze [50] is a tool to execute an unknown executable inside a virtual machine. It
captures all system calls and parameters of each system call to a log file. An expert can
check the log file to find any malicious behavior manually.
Sung A.H.et al [51] propose to collect API call sequences from assembly code and compare
these sequences to known malicious API call sequences.
Steven A. Hofmeyr et al [52] propose one of the very first data mining approaches using
dynamic system call. They build an N-Gram system call sequences database for benign
programs. For every unknown executable, they obtain system call sequences N-Grams and
compare it with the database, if they cannot find a similar N-Gram, then the detection
system triggers alert.
In [53], the authors propose several data mining approaches based on system call N-Gram
as well. They try to build a benign and malicious system call N-Gram database, and obtain
rules from this database. For unknown system call trace, they calculate a score based on the
count of benign N-Gram and malicious N-Gram. In the same paper, they also propose an
approach to use first (n-1) system calls inside N-Gram as features to predict the nth system
call. The average violation score determines the nature of the unknown executable.
In [54], the authors also use system call N-Gram. They compare three approaches based
on simple N-Gram frequency, data mining and hidden Markov model (HMM) approach, and
conclude that though HMM is slow, it usually leads to the most accurate model.
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In [55], the authors run virus executables inside a virtual machine, collecting operating
system call sequences of that program. The authors intend to cluster viruses into groups. The
authors use k-medoid clustering algorithm to group the viruses, and use Levenshtein distance
to calculate the distance between operating system call sequences of different runtime traces.
Christodorescu et al [56] examines into dynamic system calls and their arguments. The
arguments among different system calls reveal def-use, ordering, value dependent relationship
between dependency among system calls. System calls form chains and loops based on these
relationship. The authors then compute contrast subgraph by excluding benign behavior
from the dependency graph to generate virus template to detect a family of viruses.
Another research area to detect malicious software dynamically is to detect the anomaly
behavior of the victim software. Victim software should conform to its design specification
unless the software is compromised. Chari et al [57] proposes a policy driven anomaly de-
tection system. The policy used in this paper is per program based and derived manually.
Provos [58] also uses a rule based per program policy. The authors look into the parameters
used by each system call, and based on the value of parameters, permitting or denying the
system call. The policy is derived automatically by a learning process. However, the learning
algorithm is very basic. Bailey et al [59] cluster malware uses a higher level abstraction in-
stead of system calls. They use normalized compression distance (NCD) to measure distance
between two individual malware instances, then use a hierarchical clustering algorithm to
group malware.
Another approach is to derive the policy rule from static analysis [60]. The authors derive
system call policy from source code of the executable. They build non-deterministic finite
automaton(NDFA), non-deterministic pushdown automaton(NDPDA) and digraph model
out of the source code and deploy a runtime monitor system to check the conformance of
each system call.
Rabek et al [61] does not require source code. They disassemble the code and extract
address and the name of the system call. Comparing to [60], it is simpler and more general,
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but the false negative rate is higher. In [62], policy is built from dynamic trace. The policy
is represented by an automaton. The state of the automaton is the address of the caller and
the transition of the automaton is system call. Each program will need one such automaton.
Feng et al [63] uses a similar dynamic approach to build policy. They use the whole stack
information instead of address to make the policy more specific. More specific policy means
a lower false negative rate. In [64], the authors construct a control flow graph (CFG) from
the dynamic trace. They claim that the CFG derived dynamically is as good as CFG derived
from statical analysis. Chaturvedi et al [65] also derives policy from dynamic trace. However,
their focus is to learn the system call arguments rather than control flow information.
Some other approaches are based on dynamic taint analysis [66]. The idea is to keep
track of suspicious memory section inside program. Misuse of these memory section triggers
the warning. Egele et al [67] keep track of sensitive data by using dynamic taint. If the
software manage to send sensitive information out, then it is suspected to be a spyware.
Besides data dependency, [68] also tries control flow dependency. They use Qemu [69]to
explore multiple path execution. For every conditional branch based on input data, they
create a snapshot, add constraint then do a depth first exploration. After one branch has
been fully explored, they restore the state to previous snapshot, change the condition value
to explore next branch.
All those researches show the efforts and achievements in unknown program classification
and analysis.
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CHAPTER 3: DYNAMIC EXECUTION MONITOR
3.1 Overview
Our detection algorithm is based on dynamic instruction sequences. Dynamic instruc-
tion sequences collection requires running the benign or malicious code. However, running
malicious code is potentially destructive. Running program inside a virtual machine such
as VMware [70] protects the computer from being infected directly. For virus researchers,
running a program inside a virtual machine is a norm; However, most end user computers do
not have virtual machine software installed and it is not realistic to ask end user to run an
unknown program inside a virtual machine just to capture dynamic instruction sequences.
To this end, we develop a protection mechanism called dynamic execution monitor and run
the program within it. The main functionality for our dynamic execution monitor is to
capture the instruction sequences of an arbitrary executable without destroying end user’s
computer. This dynamic execution monitor is run from the user computer and it provides
control mechanism after execution of each instruction.
Figure 3.1 shows dynamic execution monitor we have built. The protection is provided
by a sandbox to ensure malicious behavior is contained. The sandbox hooks potentially
destructive Win32 API functions. Instead of simply ignoring the function and returning
failure to the caller, for most functions, we return success and invoke the function in a
restrictive way to elicit more malicious behavior. For example, when a program requests a
file handler with read/write permission, we return success and give the handler with read
permission only. In this way, we can elicit malicious behavior as much as possible. Some
viruses would stop execution if they detect failure of a particular system call.
We capture dynamic instruction sequences or system call depending on backend we are
using.
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Figure 3.1: Dynamic Instruction Sequence Capturing System
Dynamic instruction sequences are captured by our program debugger. We will put the
unknown program running under single instruction execution mode. At single instruction
execution mode, it is possible to log the current instruction into instruction sequences log
file.
We have two different backend for the monitor.
In dynamic instruction sequences backend, we embed the code to organize the code into
logic assembly (See chapter 4), and then simplify it into abstract assembly. Also we have c4.5
and support vector machine code built into our monitor. Once we have abstract assembly,
we will invoke c4.5 or support vector machine classifier to make an intelligent guess whether
the unknown executable is malicious or not.
In system call backend, we construct structural system call diagram based on captured
system calls. We then generate smart signature and use the smart signature to determine
the nature of the unknown program.
24
3.2 Malicious Behavior Sandbox
The first goal of our dynamic execution monitor is to build a sandbox and run the
unknown executable inside the sandbox to contain potentially malicious behavior.
Malicious behavior can be either permanent or temporary. Permanent effect persists even
if the user restarts his or her computer. Permanent effect of a malicious code is achieved by
modifying the content of end user’s hard disk. This can be achieved by:
(i) Modify system executables or dynamic linked libraries (DLLs)
(ii) Modify frequently used application executables or dynamic linked libraries
(iii) Leave executable modules in the end user’s computer, and modify the registry entry
to point to that executable module
(iv) Change system settings, such as system clock, computer names, etc
These compromises can be achieved by the following types of Win32 APIs:
(i) File manipulation API
(ii) Registry manipulation API
(iii) System administration API
If a Win32 API is read only, we consider it safe. If a Win32 API is able to modify,
create or delete entries, we need to take action to prevent the permanent effect on end user’s
computer.
Temporary effect of a malicious code is the compromise of end user’s memory. Once the
end user restarts his or her computer, the malicious behavior disappears. However, during
the up time of the infected computer, some severe consequences may already happen. These
include:
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(i) Send out packets to predefined site to launch DDos attack
(ii) Send out private information on the end user’s computer to malicious users
(iii) Send out infectious packets to compromise other computers
(iv) Send or receive packets to or from other computers on behalf of the malicious user
These kinds of malicious effects can be contained by restraining the packets sent by the
host computer.
Some malicious software do not compromise the victim computer directly. Instead, it
injects malicious code into an innocent process of the system, and let the victim process do
all the malicious work. This makes the malicious software more stealthy in that it diverts
the malicious behavior to the process we are not focusing on.
According to [71], there are three ways to inject code into another process. They are:
(i) Install a system wide remote hook by invoking “SetWindowsHookEx”
(ii) Create a remote thread and force the remote thread to load a malicious dynamic linked
library, the initialization code of that dynamic linked library will lead to the execution
of the injected code
(iii) Inject code into remote process by invoking “WriteProcessMemory”, and then create
a remote thread to execute the injected code
To prevent this type of attack, we need to restrict the invocation of the following Win32
APIs:
(i) SetWindowsHookEx
(ii) WriteProcessMemory
(iii) CreateRemoteThread
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Another consequence of malicious code is disrupting the normal operation of the victim
computer. However, compare to the above consequences, this temporary effect is relatively
minor and insignificant. Containing all malicious behavior is impossible because some ma-
licious behavior is hard to be distinguished from normal operations without human intel-
ligence. So the focus of our monitor is to contain permanent or severe malicious behavior
only, not all malicious behavior. Containing all malicious behavior is costly and impossible.
Currently, our monitor only protects one process and does not provide protection to
processes launched by that process. To make sure we do not launch a malicious process, we
do not allow process creation API for the executable process under protection for the time
being.
3.3 Elicit Malicious Behaviors
By skipping the potentially destructive Win32 APIs, we can ensure most permanent
or severe malicious behaviors are contained. However, the ultimate goal for our dynamic
execution monitor is to capture the instruction sequences and analyze the malicious patterns.
For a good programming practice, programmers need to verify the return value and output
parameters of each Win32 API invocation. For most Win32 APIs, the return value is boolean
and indicates whether the Win32 API is successful or not. If the return value or output
parameters indicate that there is an error during the API invocation, the program will
usually divert from the normal execution flow and handle the exception. However, for our
purpose, we are more interested in normal execution flow of an executable rather than the
exception handling. So simply skipping the potentially destructive Win32 API and throwing
an error to the invoking program does not serve our purpose; hence, for most potentially
destructive Win32 APIs, we skip the action but return a success to the caller. The invoking
program sees the success of the Win32 API and continues the normal execution. Further,
for some Win32 APIs which have output parameters, we set it to a typical value if possible.
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For example, Win32 API “WriteFile” has an output value for the actual bytes written, we
set it to the bytes to write. This gives the calling program the impression that all bytes
are written successfully. It is possible that the program will eventually fail because of the
skipped action of that Win32 API, but before that, we are able to capture more instruction
sequences than otherwise.
The return value of some Win32 APIs are system handles. These Win32 APIs include
CreateFileMapping, CreateFile, OpenFileMapping, etc. If these Win32 APIs fail, the return
values are NULL. To elicit malicious behavior, we do not return NULL to the invoking
program. Instead, we create or open a restrictive system handle. That is, no matter what
access the program requests, we only create or open a read only system handle if possible.
The invoking program will get a valid handle and continue normal processing. The API for
consequent manipulations of the system handle are also contained. So unless the invoking
program depends on the actual consequences of that Win32 API, the executable will continue
its normal execution flow.
Some program will check whether it is running inside a debugger. If it is, the program
takes a different execution path to avoid being analyzed. One of the easiest and most
popular approach is to invoke “IsDebuggerPresent” Win32 API. To make sure that in this
case, the program is able to take the normal execution path, we always answer “no” to
“IsDebuggerPresent” Win32 API.
3.4 API Protection Policy
We provide protection to satisfy above mentioned requirements in our sandbox. However,
we have another constraint. Currently, our sandbox only provide protection to the executable
module and also dynamic linked libraries with static binding. Dynamic bound DLLs are not
protected for the time being. To make sure that the executable is well protected by our
sandbox, we also modify the behavior of “LoadLibrary” and “GetProcAddress”. When a
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program invoke “LoadLibrary”, we do not actually load the dynamic linked library, instead,
we return a fake module handle. “GetProcAddress” will recognize the fake handle and return
a fake function pointer. The invocation of the fake function pointer will fail, but before that,
we may be able to capture a lot more instruction sequences. However, the inability to protect
Win32 API inside dynamic bound DLLs is a constraint and we plan to improve it in our
future work.
Based on the discussion above, our sandbox manipulates the executions of the following
categories of Win32 APIs.
(i) File/directory/registry manipulation API
(ii) Remote process/thread/memory manipulation
(iii) LoadLibrary/GetProcAddress
(iv) System administration API (system clock, etc)
(v) Packet sending
Table 3.1 lists all the functions we manipulate. For most of these Win32 APIs, we simply
skip the action and return success to the invoking program. Some Win32 APIs need special
treatment as we mentioned above. Those functions are underlined in the table.
3.5 Implementation
Windows system calls are invoked through several dynamic linked libraries. The most
important libraries include “kernel32.dll”, “user32.dll”, “advapi32.dll” and “winsock.dll”.
“kernel32.dll” contains core operating system functions such as process management, mem-
ory management and io management. “advapi32.dll” is a supplement to “kernel32.dll” and
it contains new functionality such as registry management API. “user32.dll” contains GUI
related functionality and “winsock.dll” contains WinSock API.
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Table 3.1: Intercepted Functions
CopyFile CopyFileEx CopyMetaFile
CreateDirectory CreateDirectoryEx CreateFileMapping
CreateFile CreateProcess CreateRemoteThread
DeleteFile GetProcAddress IsDebuggerPresent
LoadLibrary LoadLibraryEx MoveFile
MoveFileEx OpenFile OpenFileMapping
RemoveDirectory SetEndOfFile SetFileAttributes
SetFilePointer SetFileTime SetSystemTime
SetupComm WSAConnect WSASend
WSASendTo WriteFile WriteFileEx
WritePrivateProfileSection WritePrivateProfileString WritePrivateProfileStruct
WriteProcessMemory WriteProfileSection WriteProfileString
send sendto RegOpenKeyEx
RegCreateKeyEx RegDeleteKey RegDeleteKeyEx
RegDeleteValue RegLoadKey RegOpenCurrentUser
RegOpenUserClassesRoot RegReplaceKey RegRestoreKey
RegSaveKey RegSaveKeyEx RegSetValueEx
These dynamic linked libraries are Win32 specific and are well documented. The APIs
are consistent as Windows operating system evolves. However, Win32 is only one of the
subsystems Windows operating system provides. Internally, these dynamic linked libraries
are merely a wrap over the underlying system functions. The shared underlying module for
all subsystems is “ntdll.dll”. Intercepting “ntdll.dll” will protect all subsystems of Windows
operating system. Intercepting “ntdll.dll” is possible, however, “ntdll.dll” is undocumented
and its API changes constantly even for a minor upgrade for Windows.
Most operating system functions have to be performed in kernel mode. So in most of
time, “ntdll.dll” acts as a gateway to the kernel code. Kernel code is accessed by invoking
“Sysenter/Syscall” instruction or “int 2E” interrupt. Kernel code to serve Win32 APIs is
provided by the module “ntoskrnl.exe”.
Figure 3.2 illustrates architecture of Windows system.
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Figure 3.2: Win32 Architecture
There are a couple of ways to hook customized code into the Win32 APIs. The first
approach is to intercept higher level Win32 API calls. These APIs are documented and
consistent through different versions of Windows.
The second approach is to intercept “ntdll.dll”. The upside is that some malicious soft-
ware invokes APIs in “ntdll.dll” directly to bypass higher level Win32 API hooks. If that
happens, “ntdll.dll” hook is still effective. The downside is that “ntdll.dll” is undocumented
and changes fast. It makes it hard to write the hook code and the code requires lots of
maintenance as the operating system evolves.
It is also possible to hook kernel code. The key is the service descriptor tables structure
defined by Windows operating system. It is a mapping from dispatch ID to the entry point
of service code. Changing entry point in the service descriptor divert the regular execution
of a service code. User can put their own logic into the existing operating system code. The
problem is the same with “ntdll.dll” approach, that is, no documentation and complicated
code maintenance.
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Figure 3.3: Trampoline
We choose to use high level Win32 API interception in our experiment. We use Microsoft
detour library [72] to implement our protection mechanism. Detour is a library freely avail-
able from Microsoft Research. Detour hook arbitrary user code onto Win32 API call. It
provide API call to modify the first several instructions of the target function with a “jmp”
instruction. “jmp” instruction diverts the execution flow to the user supplied code. However,
the replaced instructions of the target function are not lost. They are saved by Detour to
a newly appended section of the executable code. Inside the user supplied code, the user
can optionally invoke the original version of the system call through a trampoline function.
Figure 3.3 illustrates the structure of a trampoline function.
3.6 Instruction Capturing
To capture the dynamic instruction sequences of an unknown program, we create process
of the program and put it in single instruction execution mode. Our monitor system will
capture debug events and log the instructions executed by the unknown program.
To focus on the behavior of the unknown program module, we only capture the binary
code of the module itself and ignore instructions inside dynamic linked library modules.
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Since we do not capture instruction sequences inside dynamic linked library modules, we
do not need to put the processor into single instruction execution mode while it is running
the code from dynamic linked library modules. Before the control flow returns to the main
executable, we do not need to capture any instruction sequences. We shall let the code
run in full speed. To achieve this, we monitor the control flow of the executable while it is
running under our debugger. Once it invokes a dynamic system call to other module, we put
a break point on the next instruction in the executable module, and then put the process
out of single step debugging mode. Once the control flow comes back, it stops at the break
point and we can put it into single step debugging mode again.
The speed of instruction sequences capturing depends on how much time our monitor
is actually capturing instruction sequences. During external dynamic library calls, which
include Win32 API call and user supplied external functions, our monitor do not capture
instruction sequences. However, the speed to capture instruction sequences is much more
consistent than the speed to capture system calls. Usually the monitor system can capture
about 6,000 instruction sequences on our computer. We also put a time limit on our monitor.
The monitored executable stops execution anyway after 10 seconds even if it cannot capture
enough instruction sequences.
This approach is very similar to the popular debugging tool OllyDbg [73]. The “instruc-
tion trace” functionality provided by OllyDbg is able to generate runtime instruction trace
in the same form as our monitor. The speed of instruction capturing is similar. However,
comparing to use OllyDbg directly, our dynamic instruction monitor has two advantages:
(i) Our monitor captures the instructions in a more controlled way. We can have an up
bound for the instructions we are planning to capture. We also have a timeout limit
to stop the instruction sequences capturing to make sure the instruction capturing
process is finished within an acceptable amount of time
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Figure 3.4: Captured Instruction Sequences
(ii) Our monitor runs under the sandbox and potential malicious behavior of the unknown
executable is contained
Figure 3.4 illustrates the captured instruction sequences of an executable.
Once we capture the binary codes, we then disassemble the binary code. From the
assembly code, we can capture instruction sequences we need.
3.7 Backend
From the captured dynamic instruction sequences, we further process it in our backend.
For dynamic instruction sequences backend, further processing include:
(i) Reorganize the dynamic instruction sequences into logic assembly
(ii) Simplify logic assembly into abstract assembly
(iii) Extract top instruction associations from abstract assembly
(iv) Apply classification model on extracted features and make predication. We use either
C4.5 decision tree or support vector machine classifiers
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Details of these steps will be elaborated in chapter 4.
For structural system call diagram backend, further processing include:
(i) Construct structural system call diagram
(ii) Generate smart signature based on modularized system call blocks
(iii) Use the smart signature to determine the nature of unknown program
Details of structural system call diagram can be found in chapter 5
3.8 Limitation
There are several limitations exist in our system.
(i) Some malicious program will invoke the underlying operating system native API in
ntdll.dll or invoke interrupt 2e (or SysEnter/SysCall, on newer versions of Windows)
directly, which is not protected by our system.
(ii) Only one execution path will be explored during one invocation of the monitored
executable
(iii) Only initial part of the executable is considered
For 1, we are trying to relieve it by hooking the kernel code instead of high level Win32
API. Problem 2 and 3 are common in all dynamic virus detection approaches. Dynamic
approaches alone can hardly solve these problems. We shall explore the possibilities to use
both dynamic approaches and static approaches to find a solution.
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CHAPTER 4: DETECTING WIN32 VIRUSES USING
DYNAMIC INSTRUCTION SEQUENCES
In this chapter, we present a novel approach to detect unknown virus using dynamic
instruction sequences mining techniques. We collect runtime instruction sequences from
unknown executables and organize instruction sequences into basic blocks. We extract in-
struction sequence patterns based on three types of instruction associations within derived
basic blocks. Following a data mining process, we perform feature extraction, feature selec-
tion and then build a classification model to learn instruction association patterns from both
benign and malicious dataset automatically. By applying this classification model, we can
predict the nature of an unknown program. We also build a program monitor which is able
to capture runtime instruction sequences of an arbitrary program. The monitor utilizes the
derived classification model to make an intelligent guess based on the information extracted
from instruction sequences to decide whether the tested program is benign or malicious. Our
result shows that our approach is accurate, reliable and efficient.
We start with system overview in 4.1, logic assembly in 4.2, the concept of instruct
association in 4.3, data mining process in 4.4, performance analysis in 4.5, our experimental
results in 4.7, comparison with other approaches in 4.8, an analysis tool to provide a shell
to this approaches in 4.9.
4.1 SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Figure 4.1 shows the overview of our system. It includes both training process and the
decision process. We have already discussed dynamic instruction collection process before.
So start from dynamic instruction sequences, the training process derives logic assembly and
abstract assembly. From abstract assembly, we can derive our feature vector. Through our
feature selection and modeling process, we can build our classification model. On the end user
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Figure 4.1: System Overview
side, we install a monitoring system which will run unknown program under our protection
mechanism. Based on the captured dynamic instruction sequences we run a decision process
which derives logic assembly and abstract assembly, collects all the required features of the
classification model, and uses these features to make our decision by the classification model.
Every classification model includes model parameters, feature set, and classifier. On the
end user’s computer, models are constantly updated through an automatic update process.
Latest models are built using the up to date virus and benign dataset to maintain the
quality of the classification model. End user also has the ability to change preferred model
through a GUI, see Figure 4.2. In this dialog, 10 best models are sorted on accuracy (over
testing dataset). The user can see how many instructions the model collects (n), what type
of instruction association does it use (IAType), what is the classifier (model), how many
features does it use (feature), what is false positive rate (fpr) and false negative rate (fnr).
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Figure 4.2: Model Selector
4.2 LOGIC ASSEMBLY
Our dynamic instruction capturing system captures execution log at a rate around 6,000
instructions per second on our computer. For some executables requiring interaction, we use
the most straightforward way, such as typing “enter” key in a command line application or
press “Ok” button in a GUI application to respond.
In a conventional disassembler, assembly instructions are organized into basic blocks. A
basic block is a sequence of instructions without any jump targets in the middle. Usually
disassembler will generate a label for each basic block automatically. However, execution log
generated by our system is simply a chronological record of all instructions executed. The
instructions do not group into basic blocks and there are no labels. We believe that basic
blocks capture the structure of instruction sequences and thus we process the instruction
traces and organize them into basic blocks. We call the resulting assembly code “logic
assembly”.
Compared with assembly code, dynamic captured instruction sequences may have in-
complete code coverage. This fact implies the following consequences about logic assembly
code:
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(i) Some basic blocks may be completely missing
(ii) Some basic blocks may contain less instructions
(iii) Some jump targets may be missing, which makes two basic blocks merge together
Despite these differences, logic assembly carries as much structural information of a
program as possible.
We design the algorithm to construct logic assembly from runtime instructions trace.
The algorithm consists of three steps and we describe below:
(i) Sort all instructions in the execution log on their virtual addresses. Repeated code
fragments will be ignored
(ii) Scan all jump instructions. If the address of an instruction is a destination of control
flow transfer instruction (conditional or unconditional), or the previous instruction is
a control flow transfer instruction, we mark it as the beginning of a new basic block
(iii) Output sorted instructions and generate labels if applicable
We further prove that instructions inside a basic block are consecutive. Here consecutive
means there is no hole inside address space representing the binary code of the basic block.
If not, suppose there is a gap between adjacent instruction i1 and i2 inside the same basic
block, then there must be a control flow transfer instruction j leads to i2, and j must be right
before i2. So j should be in our chronicle instruction log as well. We will generate a new
label for instruction i2. Then i1 and i2 should be in different basic blocks. This contradicts
our initial assumption.
Each instruction usually consists of operation code (opcode) and operands. Some instruc-
tion sets such as 80x86 also have instruction prefix to represent repetition, condition, etc. We
pay attention to the opcode and ignore the operands and prefix since the opcode represents
the behavior of the program. The resulting assembly code is called abstract assembly [74].
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Figure 4.3: Logic Assembly and Abstract Assembly
Figure 4.3 shows an example of logic assembly and abstract assembly. Figure 4.3.a is
the original instruction sequences captured by our system. We remove duplicated code from
line 7 to line 14, and generate label for jump destination line 3. Figure 4.3.b is the logic
assembly we generated. We further omit the operands and keep only opcode, and we finally
get abstract assembly as in figure 4.3.c.
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Figure 4.4: Different Incarnations
One merit of using dynamic instruction sequences is that dynamic instruction sequences
expose some type of self-modifying behavior. If a program modifies its code at runtime, we
observe two different instructions at the same virtual address in runtime trace. A program
may even modify its own code more than once. We devise a mechanism to capture this
behavior while constructing logic assembly.
We associate an incarnation number for each virtual address we have seen in the dynamic
instruction sequences. Initial incarnation number is 1. Each time we see an instruction at
the a virtual address, we compare this instruction with the one we have seen before at
that virtual address, if there is any. If the instruction changes, we increment the incarnation
number. Subsequent jump instruction will mark the beginning of a basic block on the newest
incarnation. We treat instructions of different incarnations as different code segments, and
generate basic blocks separately. Figure 4.4 illustrates this process. In this way we keep the
behavior of any historical invocations even if the code is later overwritten by newly generated
code.
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4.3 INSTRUCTION ASSOCIATIONS
With abstract assembly we are interested in finding relationship among instructions
within each basic block. We believe the way instruction sequences group together within
each block carries the information of the behavior of an executable.
The instruction sequences we are interested in are not limited to consecutive and ordered
sequences. Virus writers frequently change the order of instructions and insert irrelevant
instructions manually to create a new virus variation. Further, metamorphic viruses [3]
automatically change the order of sequences and insert garbage among useful instructions
to make new virus copies. The resulting virus variation still exhibits the malicious behavior.
However, any detection mechanism based on consecutive and ordered sequences such as
N-Gram could be fooled.
We have two considerations to obtain the relationship among instructions. First, whether
the order of instructions matters or not; Second, whether the instructions should be consec-
utive or not. Based on these two criteria, we use three methods to collect features.
(i) The order of the sequences is not considered and there could be instructions in between
(ii) The order of instructions is considered. However, it is not necessary for instruction
episodes to be consecutive
(iii) The instructions are both ordered and consecutive
We call these “Type 1”, “Type 2” and “Type 3” instruction associations. “Type 3”
instruction association is similar to N-Gram. “Type 2” instruction association can deal with
garbage insertion. “Type 1” instruction association can deal with both garbage insertion
and code reordering.
Figure 4.5 illustrates different types of instruction associations of length 2 we have ob-
tained on an instruction sequences consisting of 4 instructions.
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Figure 4.5: Example for instruction associations of length 2
4.4 DATA MINING
4.4.1 Process Overview
The overall data mining process can be divided into 7 steps. They are:
(i) Run executable inside a virtual machine, obtain instruction sequences from our system
(ii) Construct logic assembly
(iii) Generate abstract assembly
(iv) Feature selection
(v) Generating training dataset and testing dataset
(vi) Build classification models
(vii) Evaluation
This process is illustrated in Figure 4.6.
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Figure 4.6: Data Mining Process
4.4.2 Feature Selection
Here we describe step iv which is feature selection in detail. The features for our classi-
fier are instruction associations. To select appropriate instruction associations, we use the
following two criteria:
(i) The instruction associations should be frequent in the training dataset consisting of
both benign and malicious executables. If it occurs very rarely, we would rather con-
sider this instruction association is a noise and not use it as our feature
(ii) The instruction associations should be an indicator of benign or malicious code; In
other words, it should be abundant in benign code and rare in malicious code, or vice
versa
To satisfy the first criteria, we only extract frequent instruction associations from training
dataset. Only frequent instruction associations will be considered as our feature.
We use a variation of Apriori algorithm [75] to generate all three types of frequent in-
struction associations from abstract assembly.
The basic idea of the Apriori algorithm in our experiment is to generate candidate in-
struction combinations of particular size and then scan the whole file to count these to see
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Figure 4.7: Apriori Algorithm
if they are frequent enough [7]. One observation is that if one instruction combination is
frequent, then all its subsets must be frequent. First, all 1-instruction will be counted. If the
percentage of lines containing such instruction exceeds the minimum support, we will mark
it frequent. All 2-instructions candidates will be generated based on frequent 1-instruction.
Only the 2-instructions whose 1-instruction subset is frequent will be considered as a can-
didate. Another round of file scan will be needed and all 2-instructions candidates will be
counted. This process continues until no longer candidates are generated as shown in figure
4.7.
Although there exist algorithms to optimize Apriori algorithm [76], the optimization is
only applicable to type 1 instruction association. Besides, this step only occurs at training
time. We believe optimizing decision process is more critical because it will run on each end
user computer under protection. Training, however, only need to be done on some specific
server computers.
One parameter of Apriori algorithm is “minimum support”. It is the minimal frequency
of frequent associations among all data. More specifically, it is the minimum percentage of
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basic blocks that contains the instruction sequences in our case. We have done experiments
on different support level as described in section 4.7.
To satisfy the second criteria, we define the term contrast:
Contrast(Fi) =

Bcount(Fi)+ε
Mcount(Fi)+ε Bcount(Fi) ≥Mcount(Fi)
countM(Fi)+ε
Bcount(Fi)+ε Bcount(Fi) < Mcount(Fi)
.
BCount (Fi) normalized count of Fi in benign instruction file
MCount (Fi) normalized count of Fi in malicious instruction file
ε a small constant to avoid error when the denominator is 0
In this formula, normalized count is the frequency of that instruction sequences divided
by the total number of basic blocks in abstract assembly. We use a slightly larger benign
code dataset than malicious code dataset. The use of normalization will factor out the effect
of unequal dataset size.
We select top L features as our feature set. For one executable in training dataset,
we count the number of basic blocks containing the feature, normalized by the number of
basic blocks of that executable. We process every executable in our training dataset, and
eventually we generate the input for our classifier.
4.4.3 Classification
We use two classifiers in our experiments: decision tree and Support Vector Machine.
4.4.3.1 Decision Tree
Decision tree is a classification algorithm that is constructed by recursively splitting the
dataset into parts. Each such split is determined by the result of the statistical test of
all possible splits among all attributes inside the tree node. This statistical test can be
Gini, entropy gain or Chi-square test. The decision tree keeps growing as more splits are
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performed until a specific stop rule is satisfied. Typical stop rules include minimum record
number inside a tree node, maximum depth of the tree, and purity of the records in a node.
After growing a full tree, an additional process called postpruning can be used to simplify
the decision tree. During postpruning, some splits are removed while others are retained.
Postpruning can reduce overfitting problem. Each leaf node is then tagged with majority
class of its records and complete the construction of the decision tree.
Once a decision tree is built, it is used for classification of a new record. When a record
of an unknown class comes in, it is classified through a sequence of nodes from the tree root
down to the leaf node. Then, it is labeled by the class the leaf node represents. Depending
on the choice of split criteria, stop rules, postpruning strategies, and some other properties,
there are several variations of decision trees such as ID3 [77], C4.5 [78], CART [79], and
CHAID [80].
C4.5 is a popular decision tree package based on ID3. It uses entropy gain as its splitting
criteria. The splitting will stop only when all records within a node is of the same class or
a node is too small. After C4.5 tree has fully grown, there is a pruning process. C4.5 takes
both discreet and continuous features.
We use Quinlan’s c4.5 decision tree [78] as our decision tree implementation.
4.4.3.2 Support Vector Machine
Support vector machine (SVM) [81, 82] receives attention since its advent. It is consid-
ered to be one of the most stable and accurate classifiers. SVM is essentially a mathematical
optimization problem which has originated from the linear discriminant problem, see fig-
ure 4.8.a. There are two approaches for finding the optimal linear discriminant in a linear
separable case. The first approach is to find the best plane bisects closest points in the
convex hull, see figure 4.8.b and the second approach is to find the best plane maximizes the
margin, see figure 4.8.c.
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Figure 4.8: Support Vector Machine
The optimization method works even in a linear inseparable case. In convex hull ap-
proach, the convex hull will shrink to make two classes linear separable, see figure 4.8.d. In
maximum margin approach, we allow some errors for the margin (soft margin), that means,
some data may not obey the discriminant. We will calculate the total error term of these
data, the smaller the error term, the better the discriminant, see figure 4.8.e.
SVM extends this simple linear case. The idea is, if two classes are inseparable in two
dimensions such as figure 4.8.a, SVM can use a mapping, which is called kernel function,
to map two dimension data into a higher dimension. The two classes may be separable in
higher dimension. Even if it is still inseparable, the error term may be much smaller.
We use libSVM [83] package in our experiments. It is based on SMO (Sequential Minimal
Optimization) [84], which is regarded as one of the best implementations for SVM. libSVM
takes both categorical and continuous features. It is a C implementation of SVM on Unix.
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4.4.3.3 Other Classifier
We also tested some other classifiers such as random forests [85]. We do not detect
any classifier has clear advantage over others in the measure of accuracy. One reason leads
us to use C4.5 and SVM in our experiment is that both classifiers are efficient to make
decision. The performance of decision making process is the key to our system performance
(See Section 4.5). Recently, we did some preliminary experiments on TreeNet [86]. we see
improvements by using this new classifier. We need to more extensive experiment using
TreeNet in our future work.
4.4.4 N-folds Cross Validation
Cross validation [87] is a method to generate relatively fair performance measurements
from the dataset. It first divides the whole dataset randomly into n equal size folds. Every
time we use n-1 folds as training dataset and use the remaining 1 fold as testing dataset.
This process is repeated n times. Every fold is selected as testing dataset once. The overall
performance is calculated by averaging all n results. The result of N-folds cross validation
is more accurate than simple training dataset / testing dataset approach. This approach is
especially useful for a small dataset. It keeps most data as training dataset, resulting in a
more accurate classification model. By averaging n results, this approach does not suffer the
randomness caused by a small testing dataset.
4.4.5 Ensemble Model
One approach to improve the classification accuracy is using an ensemble model which is
a combination of several different models. Usually a majority vote will be performed and the
winner decides the final classification of the unknown case. Compare to a single classifier,
ensemble model is more robust and resistant to overfitting. However, it takes more time
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to build and apply an ensemble model since it will build several classifiers rather than one.
Bagging [88] and boosting [89] are two most popular ensemble models.
4.4.6 Performance Measurement
In this thesis, performance of the classification models are measured by three criteria.
They are accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate. In a two-category classification
problem, the classification result will be one of the following cases:
(i) true and classified as true (True Positive)
(ii) false but classified as true (False Positive)
(iii) false and classified as false (True Negative)
(iv) true but classified as false (False Negative)
And (All cases) = (True Positive) + (False Positive) + (True Negative) + (False Nega-
tive).
Here are the definition of accuracy, false positive rate (FPR) and false negative rate
(FNR) respectively:
Accuracy = (TruePositive)+(TrueNegative)
All
FPR = FalsePositive
(TruePositive)+(FalsePositive)
FNR = FalseNegative
(TrueNegative)+(FalseNegative)
False positive rate is the proportion of benign executables that were erroneously reported
as being malicious. On contrary, false negative rate is the proportion of malicious executables
that were erroneously identified as benign.
In short, accuracy is the overall accuracy in testing dataset, false positive rate is the
accuracy among all positive case, false negative rate is the accuracy among all negative case.
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4.5 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we focus on average performance in measure of speed when applying the
classification model on the end user computer. The performance to process one unknown
executable is determined by the following factors:
(i) Capturing instruction sequences
(ii) Generating logic assembly
(iii) Counting the occurrence of instruction associations in feature set to generate feature
vector
(iv) Applying classification model
Unlike system calls, instruction sequences are generated fast and at a relative stable rate.
On our test computer, we generate an average of 6,000 instruction sequences in 1 second
inside our system. That is enough for the input for our classifier. This is one advantage over
system call approach, which takes more time to collect enough traces.
However, instruction sequences collection rate is not really stable. We could spend much
more time than average to capture enough instruction sequences. For example, some system
calls will block the process so we cannot capture any instructions for this program module
during system call. Some program will wait for user’s response to continue executing. To
solve this problem, we also specify a time limit on instruction capturing. We will stop
capturing instruction sequences and continue to the next step when a timeout occurs.
Generating logic assembly consists of three phases. In the first phase, we need to sort
the instruction sequences according to their virtual address. This could take up to O(nlogn)
to finish, in which n is the number of instructions captured. In the second phase, we mark
jump destination using one linear scan of all instructions, which takes O(n). Maintaining
different incarnations requires a memory map to remember the instruction and incarnation
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of each virtual address. Every instruction takes linear time to check this memory map, so
this additional task will not increase the order of the overall processing time. Finally, we
traverse the sorted instruction list to output basic blocks, which takes O(n). So the overall
time complexity in logic assembly generation is O(nlogn).
Generating features vector requires counting the frequency of L features. Suppose one
basic block contains average k instructions, thus we have average n/k basic blocks. For every
basic block, we will do a search for each one of L features.
Different types of instruction association require different approaches to search inside a
basic block. For type 1 instruction association, we use an occurrence bit for every instruction
in the association, if all bit is on, then the basic block contains that instruction association.
For type 2, we construct a finite state machine (FSM), and scan the basic block from the
beginning. If we encounter an instruction matching the state in FSM, we change the state
of FSM, and begin matching the next instruction. For type 3, it is similar to a substring
search. All these three types of search requires one linear scan of the basic block, makes the
average complexity O(k).
We can calculate the processing time of feature vector generation as the product of the
above factors. So this step takes (search time per feature per basic block)* (feature number)
* (basic block number) = O(n/k*k*L) = O(nL).
The time complexity to apply a classifier is a property of that specific classifier.
For C4.5 decision tree, the applying time complexity is proportional to the depth of the
tree [78], which is a constant at the decision time. SVM takes O(L) time to apply the model
on a specific feature vector [90].
Based on the discussion above, we conclude that the average time complexity to process
an unknown executable is bounded by max (O(nlogn), O(nL)), in which L is the number of
features.
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In our experiment, to process instructions captured in 1 second, for which n≤6000, the
calculation time is usually less than 3 seconds. This suggests that this approach can be used
in practice.
4.6 Dataset
Due to the prevailing dominance of Win32 viruses today, we use Win32 viruses as our
virus dataset. We collect 267 Win32 viruses from VX heaven [91].
We also choose 368 benign executables which consist of Windows system executables,
commercial executables and open source executables. These executables have similar average
size and variation as the malicious dataset.
Some viruses fail to execute fully and we can only collect less than 10 dynamic instruc-
tions. We exclude these viruses from our dataset due to lack of enough information for
further processing. By manually analyzing these viruses, we found that these viruses quit
early due to failure to identify or execute some system functions. This is usually due to
the virus author making false assumption about the operating system which is not present
in the destination system. For example, Win32.Alcaul.b is trying to write to a read only
page at 5th instruction. While it is possible in earlier version of Windows, current version of
Windows correct the problem and this operation is no longer possible. The virus code quit
quickly due to access violation. All such viruses we have encountered are not actually pre-
senting malicious behavior before they quit and thus would not destroy end user computer.
So we believe ignoring these viruses in our system would not cause a big problem.
In one experiment, we try to use IDA Pro [41] to get a assembly code from each binary
executable. Our study shows that a non-negligible amount of binary executables cannot
be fully disassembled. Only around 50% of malicious executables can be fully disassembled
and more than 10% of them cannot be disassembled at all; that means the disassembler
recognizes no identifiable instructions in the binary executable at all. For benign executables,
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Table 4.1: Dataset Statistics
Benign Virus
Number 368 267
Average Binary Size 126k 38k
STDEV(size) 319k 75k
Average Assembly Lines 20495 5717
STDEV(lines) 30566 18677
around 90% executables can be fully disassembled. In those cases, further disassembly can
be achieved manually. However, manual disassembly requires advanced skills and is time
consuming. This result justifies our choice of using dynamic approach in favor of static
approach.
The dataset is publicly available at http://www.cs.ucf.edu/~daijy/instructionsequence_
dataset.zip
Table 4.1 lists key statistics for our dataset.
4.7 EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
4.7.1 Methodology
We use 5-fold cross-validation [7] to evaluate the performance in our experiments. We
randomly divide the dataset into 5 subsamples of the same size. We then repeat the cross-
validation process 5 times. Every time we use one subsample as testing dataset and all other
subsamples as training dataset. Our result is the average of all 5 runs.
In out experiment, we use accuracy on testing dataset as our main criteria in evaluation
of the performance of classification models. However, we also calculate false positive rate
and false negative rate. We believe in a virus detection mechanism, low false negative rate
is more vital than low false positive rate. It is wise to be more cautious against those
suspicious unknown executables. High false positive rate certainly make things inconvenient
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for the user, but high false negative rate will destroy a user’s computer, which is more
harmful.
4.7.2 Parameter Selection
There are five primary parameters in our classifier, they are:
(i) Instruction association type IA (type 1, 2 or 3)
(ii) Support level of frequent instruction association (S), we experiment with 0.003, 0.005,
0.01
(iii) Number of features (L), we try 10, 20, 50, 100, 200, 300. At some support level, some
instruction association types generate relatively fewer number of available features. For
example, at support lever 0.01, only 23 type 1 instruction associations are frequent. In
that case, we use up to the maximum available features
(iv) Type of classifier (C), we compare C4.5 decision tree and SVM (Support Vector Ma-
chine)
(v) Number of instruction captured (N). We try 1000, 2000, 4000, 6000, 8000
Table 4.2 list top 10 configurations we get along with training and testing accuracy.
Table 4.3 is their according false positive rate and false negative rate.
The result shows that support level 0.01 is clearly superior to others. That shows that
frequent patterns are more important than infrequent patterns.
Instruction association type 1 and 2 outperform type 3. That is an interesting result
which could serve to justify our approach over traditional N-Gram based approach in that
N-Gram checks consecutive and ordered sequence only.
The performance of SVM is a little bit better than C4.5 in our top 10 list. The average
testing accuracy of SVM in top 10 models is 0.911 compared with 0.906 of C4.5.
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Figure 4.9: Effect of L
Figure 4.9 shows the effect of number of feature L vs average accuracy among all models.
Generally, more features give more accurate result. However, the margin is small after
L>100. Larger feature number implies longer processing time for monitor system. Usually
200-300 features are optimal.
The effect of number of instructions captured N is not quite clear yet. We further
calculate average accuracy at different N in Figure 4.10. We see that generally accuracy
increases when we use a large N. However, the difference becomes very small when N>2000,
especially for testing dataset. That justifies that when we use the initial part of instructions,
we can capture the behavior of the unknown executable. One interesting phenomenon is
when N=2000, we get some really good result. Half of our top 10 models use 2000 instruction
sequences. That means in some settings, first 2000 instructions already capture the character
of the executable, further instructions might only give noise.
4.7.3 Outlier Analysis
We are interested to see if there are some common properties shared by those viruses that
fail to be correctly classified by our model. We do expect that those misclassified samples
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Figure 4.10: Effect of N
Table 4.2: Top 10 Configurations
Model# IA S L C N Accuracy
1 2 0.01 300 SVM 4000 0.954/0.919
2 2 0.01 300 SVM 2000 0.954/0.918
3 2 0.01 300 SVM 6000 0.955/0.914
4 2 0.005 300 C45 2000 0.937/0.910
5 2 0.01 200 SVM 6000 0.948/0.909
6 1 0.01 100 C45 6000 0.938/0.906
7 2 0.01 200 C45 4000 0.934/0.906
8 2 0.01 200 SVM 2000 0.949/0.904
9 2 0.01 300 SVM 2000 0.947/0.904
10 1 0.01 100 C45 2000 0.915/0.903
IA: Instruction Association type
S: Support
L: Number of features
C: Classifier
N: Number of dynamic instructions
Accuracy: Accuracy in training set / testing set
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Table 4.3: FPR/FNR for top 10 models
Model# FPR FNR
1 0.074/0.096 0.025/0.068
2 0.074/0.118 0.027/0.056
3 0.072/0.114 0.027/0.066
4 0.094/0.126 0.041/0.065
5 0.085/0.126 0.028/0.063
6 0.120/0.131 0.015/0.067
7 0.102/0.131 0.038/0.068
8 0.084/0.130 0.028/0.071
9 0.089/0.121 0.028/0.076
10 0.145/0.151 0.038/0.055
FPR: False Positive Rate for training set / testing set
FNR: False Negative Rate for training set / testing set
are “hard” viruses, such as packed, polymorphic or metamorphic viruses. However, to our
surprise, we cannot identify any shared patterns for those failed samples. Table 4.4 lists
misclassified virus samples by our top models. For a concrete example, in Win32.HLLW
virus family, we have 23 virus samples, 1 is misclassified. In Win32.HLLP virus family,
we have 27 virus samples, 3 are misclassified. None of these virus samples are packed,
polymorphic or metamorphic.
4.7.4 Decision Process
Table 4.5 shows typical processing time to process one unknown program in seconds
on our test computer. The test computer has a typical configuration of recent personal
computer with 1 AMD Turion 1.58G CPU and 1G memory. “Log” is the time to capture
necessary instruction sequences. “Assembly” is the time to construct logic assembly and
then get abstract assembly. “Feature” is the time to extract feature vector. “Model” is
the time needed to apply the classifier. Table 4.6 is normalized execution time divided into
different components.
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Table 4.4: Misclassified Sample
Virus.Win32.Ruff.4859
Virus.Win32.Evol.c
Virus.Win32.Elkern.c
Virus.Win32.Cabanas.Release
Virus.Win32.Henky.504
Virus.Win32.HLLW.Myset.b
Virus.Win32.Gaybar
Virus.Win32.HLLO.Rozak.a
Virus.Win32.Resur.b
Virus.Win32.ZMist
Virus.Win32.Chiton.p
Virus.Win32.Evyl.d
Virus.Win32.Delikon
Virus.Win32.HLLP.Xinfect.i
Virus.Win32.HLLP.Vedex.b
Virus.Win32.InvictusDLL.b
Virus.Win32.HLLP.Gezad
Virus.Win32.Kaze.3228
Virus.Win32.Seppuku.1606
Virus.Win32.Mystery.2560
Virus.Win32.Redemption.a
Virus.Win32.Ditto.1539
Virus.Win32.Refer.2939
Virus.Win32.Lash.b
Some programs could take much longer time to collect enough instruction sequences
because of some long system calls or some function requires user interaction. We have a
hard limit on “log” time which is 3s.
Other time components are relatively stable. SVM model takes significantly more time
than C4.5.
The overall processing time is usually under 3 seconds.
We also tested the capacity of our malicious behavior protection system. We run all
267 malicious programs from our dataset inside our monitor system. None of them present
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Table 4.5: Typical Runtime for Monitor System
Model# Total Log Assembly Feature Model
1 1.79 0.25 0.06 0.37 1.12
2 1.66 0.22 0.03 0.13 1.28
3 2.86 0.34 0.08 1.24 1.20
4 0.34 0.15 0.03 0.14 0.02
5 2.29 0.36 0.09 0.85 1.02
6 0.45 0.35 0.08 0.02 0.01
7 0.56 0.27 0.05 0.23 0.01
8 1.29 0.18 0.03 0.10 0.99
9 1.44 0.27 0.03 0.13 1.01
10 0.23 0.19 0.07 0.01 0.01
Table 4.6: Normalized Runtime for Monitor System
Model# NLog NAssembly NFeature NModel
1 0.06 0.015 0.031 0.37
2 0.11 0.015 0.021 0.42
3 0.06 0.013 0.069 0.40
4 0.08 0.015 0.023 /
5 0.06 0.015 0.071 0.51
6 0.06 0.013 0.003 /
7 0.07 0.013 0.029 /
8 0.09 0.015 0.025 0.50
9 0.14 0.015 0.022 0.50
NLog = Log Time / 1000 Instructions
NAssembly = Assembly Time / 1000 Instructions
NFeature = Feature Selection Time / (100 Features * 1000 Instructions)
NModel = SVM Classification Time / 100 Features
obvious malicious behavior. Although our protection scheme is not complete as discussed in
chapter 3, most viruses are well guarded by our system.
4.7.5 Ensemble Model
Ensemble model is a meta-model which applies several models simultaneously, and takes
the majority decision as the decision of the ensemble model. We use top 3, 5, 10 models to
build our ensemble model. Table 4.7 shows our result.
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Table 4.7: Performance of Ensemble Models
Model Numbers Accuracy FPR FNR
3 0.943/0.908 0.093/0.151 0.031/0.045
5 0.943/0.908 0.089/0.137 0.035/0.058
10 0.947/0.917 0.088/0.161 0.028/0.016
We do not see improvement for the result of ensemble model. Further, ensemble model
takes much more time to make decision on the monitor system. So we decide not to use
ensemble models in our system.
4.8 Comparison Study
To evaluate the performance of dynamic instruction sequences approach, we experiment
on a serial of approaches to find out the effectiveness of our dynamic instruction sequences
approach.
4.8.1 Simple Heuristics Approach
Simple heuristic features refer to the feature set extracted from Win32 PE head or strings
inside executable body.
[6] illustrates many heuristics to detect structural anomaly of Win32 viruses. In our
experiment, we use the following features:
(i) Entry point locates in the last section
(ii) Suspicious section name
(iii) Suspicious section characteristics
(iv) Inconsistent size calculation
(v) Suspicious imports by ordinal
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(vi) Critical function imports
(vii) Corrupt relocation table
(viii) Occupation rate of last block in sections (if over 10%)
In our experiment, we uses the presence of each of such feature as our boolean feature.
Since we only have 8 features, we do not perform feature selection. Like dynamic instruction
approach, we use 5-folds cross validation approach to get our result and report accuracy,
false positive and false negative on both training and testing dataset.
4.8.2 NGram Approach
N-Gram refers to consecutive binary sequences of fixed size inside binary code.
In our experiment, we repeat the experiment in [34] on our dataset, and compare the
result of N-Gram with our approach.
We select top k features as usual. For each feature, we will find out the presence of that
feature in both training and testing dataset. We also use C4.5 decision tree and support
vector machine as our classifier. We report accuracy, false positive rate and false negative
rate as well.
4.8.3 Static Assembly Approach
Static approaches are based on the features derived from static analysis. Some approaches
are based on assembly code derived by disassembling the executable binary [39]. Other
approaches are based on higher level structure based on assembly code such as control flow
graph (CFG) [37]. However, disassembling binary code itself is a hard problem and no
general solution has been discovered yet [45].
The reason for the failures in disassembling can be classified into two folds.
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(i) Encrypted and polymorphic virus can not be disassembled by conventional disassem-
bler. Each of these viruses encrypts virus body in binary file and the encrypted code
is not directly runnable. After Windows loader loads the virus into memory, execution
starts with a special part of code called decryptor. Decryptor is usually small and
not encrypted. The decryptor code will modify the memory image and restore virus
body to runnable code. Usually encryption key changes every time so that virus body
does not remain the same and thus makes signature based detection ineffective. The
difference between encrypted virus and polymorphic virus is that encrypted virus uses
a constant decryptor and polymorphic virus mutates the descriptor. Disassembler an-
alyzes the binary code statically, so it can not disassemble the virus body except for
the loader
(ii) Current disassembler uses linear sweep or recursive traversal techniques which are
inherently limited
Linear sweep disassembles binary codes into instructions byte by byte. An instruction
may consist up to 13 bytes. Linear sweep assumes the code is consecutive, there is no hole
in the between even if the previous instruction is a control flow transfer instruction. In
reality, especially in malicious code, there could be a hole after some control flow transfer
instructions, thus defeat linear sweep.
Recursive traversal try to find the destination of each transfer control instruction at first,
then perform linear sweep for each block. Even if there is a hole after the control flow transfer
instruction, the assembler still works because it does not assume that the next instruction
is the starting point of the next block. However, not all start point can be easily extracted.
Some control flow transfer instructions do not use an address constant as parameter, instead,
they use value inside a variable. The value inside a variable cannot be derived statically.
Current disassembler use some heuristics to guess the destination address of the control flow
transfer instruction. However, in many cases, this approach fails. Figure 4.11 shows an
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Figure 4.11: Wrong Assembly Code
Figure 4.12: Correct Assembly Code
example of such case IDAPro fail to disassemble. The correct form should be figure 4.12.
The first instruction is a “call” instruction and its destination is “loc 401121+1”, which refers
to “00401122”. Ideally, disassembler starts disassembling a new function from “00401122”.
However, IDAPro is not clever enough to do the calculation and only makes a simple guess
that “00401121” is the destination address. The content in “00401121” is “00”, which is
the opcode of “add” instruction. IDAPro interpret it as an “add” instruction and treat the
bytes following it as its operands. Actually, the following byte “8B” should be interpreted as
opcode. Now everything is messed up. In these cases, further disassembling can be achieved
manually in IDAPro. In the example, we can manually tell IDAPro that “00401122” is the
function start address. However, manual disassembling requires advanced skills and is time
consuming.
Some other approaches [45, 47] have also been proposed to alleviate this problem. How-
ever, none of current approaches solve the problem completely.
Although our feature is based on assembly code, the disassembility is not the key to
our approach. If an executable cannot be fully disassembled, we extract fewer instruction
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Figure 4.13: From Assembly to Abstract Assembly
sequences or no instruction sequences at all. Our process will still work even in these cases.
The disassembility becomes a heuristics in our approach.
We first disassemble the binary code into assembly code. The assembly code breaks into
natural blocks. The start point of each block is associated with a disassembler-generated
label. Usually it is a destination of a control flow instruction elsewhere in the program. For
each block, we generate a line with a sequence of instruction operation codes inside the block
as shown in Figure 4.13. The result is similar to the abstract assembly we get in dynamic
instruction sequence approach.
If an executable cannot be fully disassembled, we extract fewer sequences or no sequences
at all. Our process will still work even in these cases.
Once we get the abstract assembly, we use the same approach to extract features, select
top features and then collect the accuracy, false positive rate and false negative rate for both
training dataset and testing dataset.
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Table 4.8: Performance of Simple Heuristic Features
Accuracy FPR FNR
C4.5 0.900/0.897 0.026/0.234 0.028/0.248
SVM 0.906/0.853 0.022/0.225 0.017/0.233
Table 4.9: Performance of NGram (C4.5)
N Accuracy FPR FNR
8 0.986/0.882 0.009/0.111 0.021/0.127
10 0.981/0.896 0.007/0.082 0.035/0.135
12 0.978/0.909 0.005/0.065 0.046/0.127
14 0.981/0.917 0.009/0.054 0.003/0.123
16 0.973/0.909 0.007/0.054 0.055/0.142
18 0.976/0.906 0.009/0.084 0.044/0.108
4.8.4 Comparison Result
Table 4.8 lists the experimental result for simple heuristic features. C4.5 decision tree
performs better than support vector machine in this experiment. The accuracy over testing
dataset is 89.7%.
Table 4.9 and table 4.10 shows the experimental result of NGram features using C4.5
and SVM classifier respectively. The best performance of NGram features is achieved when
N equals to 14, using c4.5 classifier. This is in par with dynamic instruction sequences
approach. That shows NGram approach is still effective to detect current virus. However,
as we discuss before, NGram approach does not directly use instruction information of a
program. So it may not be able to capture the most important characteristic of a malicious
software.
Figure 4.14 and figure 4.15 shows the training accuracy and testing accuracy for both
C4.5 decision tree and support vector machine classifiers. From the diagram, we can see
testing accuracy of c4.5 decision tree improves when N increases from 8 to 14. After that,
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Table 4.10: Performance of NGram (SVM)
N Accuracy FPR FNR
8 0.958/0.896 0.019/0.065 0.073/0.158
10 0.957/0.904 0.018/0.060 0.078/0.146
12 0.961/0.901 0.012/0.062 0.076/0.150
14 0.961/0.904 0.013/0.051 0.075/0.157
16 0.954/0.899 0.018/0.051 0.085/0.169
18 0.957/0.904 0.017/0.052 0.077/0.157
Figure 4.14: Experimental Result for NGram (C4.5)
the testing accuracy begins to drop. For support vector machine, testing accuracy increases
first and then fluctuates when N ¿ 10. A large N does not imply a better performance.
Table 4.11 shows top 10 models using static assembly features. The best models is
achieved when support level is 0.005, feature size is 300 and instruction association type is 2.
The accuracy over testing dataset for this model is 87.5%. This is much worse than dynamic
instruction sequences features. Table 4.12 shows the false positive rate and false negative
rate for top 10 models based on static assembly features. Most of them have a higher false
negative rate than false positive rate. As we have already discussed in 4.7, low false negative
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Figure 4.15: Experimental Result for NGram (SVM)
Table 4.11: Top 10 static models
Model# IA S L C Accuracy
1 2 0.005 300 SVM 0.951/0.875
2 1 0.01 300 SVM 0.961/0.869
3 3 0.003 76 C45 0.895/0.863
4 2 0.01 300 SVM 0.961/0.861
5 2 0.01 200 SVM 0.959/0.861
6 1 0.01 200 SVM 0.942/0.853
7 2 0.003 300 SVM 0.936/0.851
8 2 0.005 100 SVM 0.942/0.849
9 1 0.003 200 C45 0.951/0.849
10 2 0.005 200 SVM 0.950/0.847
IA: Instruction Association type
S: Support
L: Number of features
C: Classifier
N: Number of dynamic instructions
Accuracy: Accuracy in training set / testing set
rate is more important than low false positive rate in real practice. It is not the case in static
assembly features approach.
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Table 4.12: FPR/FNR for top 10 static models
Model# FPR FNR
1 0.022/0.078 0.091/0.209
2 0.014/0.075 0.077/0.229
3 0.170/0.206 0.036/0.066
4 0.020/0.096 0.067/0.207
5 0.019/0.104 0.076/0.194
6 0.040/0.123 0.083/0.184
7 0.045/0.107 0.094/0.216
8 0.041/0.127 0.083/0.187
9 0.058/0.139 0.040/0.175
10 0.025/0.118 0.088/0.210
FPR: False Positive Rate for training set / testing set
FNR: False Negative Rate for training set / testing set
For all the feature sets we are comparing, simple heuristics approach and static assembly
approaches performs much worse than dynamic instruction sequences features. NGram and
dynamic instruction sequences feature achieve similar detection rate.
False negative rate for simple heuristics features, NGram features and static assembly
features are higher than false positive rate, which is not desirable for a malicious software
detection system. Dynamic instruction sequences approach instead, has a lower false negative
rate.
Dynamic instruction sequences utilize the information of instructions of a program. In-
structions capture the most important characteristic of a program. Simple heuristic feature
checks program header only. NGram feature mostly relies on program header information
and string information, which is easier to be evaded by advanced malicious software.
Based on the above analysis, we conclude that dynamic instruction sequences features is
more desirable than other three approaches we are comparing.
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4.9 Malicious Software Analysis Toolkit
our malici analysis is to analyze the executable code without actually executing the code.
Popular static analyzing approaches include PE head analysis, assembly analysis and higher
level analysis. Existing static analyzing tool include PE head viewer and disassembler.
A set of tools [92, 93, 94] can extract PE head information [25, 26] and present it to the
user. These tools print out all the information of the PE head in a list form on screen which
include PE head, data dictionary, section table, import address table (IAT), import table
and export table. However, these tools only list all the information and do not try to show
how these information locates inside an executable binary. In virus detection, the location of
these information is very important. For example, Entry point is a very important heuristics
to detect virus. Many virus codes will modify the original entry point of the victim. And
the fact that entry point points to the last section is suspicious. We need a way to visualize
the entry point within the executable and sections.
Several dissemblers [41, 92] are available for static analysis. All these dissemblers try to
disassemble the binary code globally. The techniques they are using are based either on
linear sweep or recursive traversal. However, neither solution is perfect. In many cases, we
cannot get complete assembly code automatically. IDA Pro provide manual control over
the disassembly code. You can manually adjust the assembly code if observing anything
wrong or incomplete. However, manual disassembling requires experience and quite time
consuming.
We try to build a different type of static analysis tool and focus on the visualization of
the static analysis process. We call this tool PEAnatomy. The center piece of our analyzer is
the binary representation of the executable to be analyzing. To visualize the executable, we
mark different parts of the executable with different colors. The head part of an executable
include Dos head, PE head (include data dictionary) and section table. After that, we have
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Figure 4.16: PE Anatomy Snapshot 1
a couple of sections. The entry point, import table, export table and IAT are located in
regular sections and are clearly marked as well.
For disassembling, we provide a visualized linear sweep disassembler. The difference
between our disassembler and other disassembler is that our disassembler is not focus on the
entire executable. Instead, using our visualized GUI, users can find the binary section they
are interested in, and invoke the disassembler easily with a click and drag.
Figure 4.16 and figure 4.17 show two snapshots of PEAnatomy. Figure 4.16 shows a
binary code and the right pane shows the information list of selected component. Here
the selected component is PE head. PEAnatomy is able to show information of different
structures within the binary code, include section table, import table, export table, IAT,
etc. Figure 4.17 shows the disassembling feature of PEAnatomy. By selecting a section of
binary code, we can view the according assembly code on the fly in the right pane.
Some other functions current under development are:
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Figure 4.17: PE Anatomy Snapshot 2
(i) Read binary code from memory in addition to binary file. Some worms do not have a
file trace and we need to analyze them from the bytes inside memory
(ii) Mark address constant. Address constants are double word inside the binary and the
value of the binary is within the range of address space of the executable. Address
constant is likely to be a destination of control flow transfer instruction. [45] uses
address constants to construct its disassembler. Marking address constant inside a
binary file helps us to understand the code
(iii) Consistency check. Check the consistency of the PE head listed in [6]. Mark any
inconsistency
(iv) Byte profile
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(v) Instruction sequence check. We integrate our dynamic instruction sequence approach
into PEAnatomy. We can use the result of dynamic instruction sequence check as a
criteria
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CHAPTER 5: DETECTING MALICIOUS SOFTWARE
FAMILY USING STRUCTURAL SYSTEM CALL DIAGRAM
5.1 Introduction
In this section, we present a utilization of dynamic system call trace on a family of mali-
cious software. Captured system call contains information which determines some function
of the malicious software. Using our developed visualization tool, we are able to visualize
the system call trace of an executable in a way very similar to control flow graph and hence
observe the similarities and differences of a family of malicious software. As a concrete ap-
plication, we construct smart signature to detect a family of malicious software using system
call signature. By using our visualization tool, we can manually derive the signature to
detect malicious code family. Also, we design a way to automatically generate system call
signature of the malicious software family. We do not require an exact match for a system
call signature. We use a profile hidden Markov model (PHMM) to describe a system call
signature and score it against unknown software to determine the nature of the unknown
executable.
There are two categories of malicious software analysis approaches, static approaches and
dynamic approaches.
Static approaches check executable binaries or assembly codes without actually executing
the unknown program. Based on assembly code, some advanced techniques have been tried
to construct higher level structure such as control flow graph (CFG) [37] and template [36]
to help security expert to analyze the malicious software.
Dynamic approaches require actual execution of the software being analyzed. Current
techniques include debugger [73] and system call capturer [50]. However, no analysis has
been proposed on system call trace only.
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Analyzing system call trace directly is not easy. System call trace contains repetitions
and does not break into blocks. System call trace contains important information about the
structure of the executable being analyzed. We use this information to construct a graph
similar to the control flow graph.
There are several components we capture with system call trace.
(i) Return address and stack trace
(ii) Parameters and return value
(iii) Timestamp information
To reveal the structure of a program through system call traces, stack information of
system calls is the most important. First, return address, which is located on top of stack,
reveals the point of invocation of a specific system call. Second, more return addresses on
stack reveal more functions and relations between these functions. Repetitions in the system
call trace are also very important. They reveal sequential, loop and branch structure among
different system calls. The order of system calls inside a block tells which system call comes
first and which comes next. It contains important information as well.
We build a visualization tool to show the control flow graph like structure of the system
calls. We call this a structural system call diagram.
As an application, we view and compare system call blocks between executables come
from the same malicious software family. We find that breaking down system call trace into
a structure has advantages to understand the similarities and differences between different
executables.
By utilizing well defined boundaries among system calls, we use a whole block of system
calls as a signature to detect other malicious software of the same family.
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We use two approaches to derive system call signature: (1) manual extraction with
the help of our visualizer and (2) automatic extraction by using our automatic system call
signature extraction tool without user intervention.
When malicious software evolves, it is not necessary that all system call sequences inside
a block remain the same. An exact match is too strict. In this paper, we propose a concept
smart signature which allows insertion, deletion and mutation of one or some positions inside
system call signature.
We get a system call block as a signature of the malicious software family through a
manual or automatic process. We build a profile hidden Markov model (PHMM) [95] for the
signature we derive and use it as a smart signature. For an unknown program, we feed each
block into PHMM and get a score. The higher the score, the more similar this block is to
the system call signature. If the unknown program contains a block very similar to system
call signature, we determine it belong to the malicious software family.
5.2 Capturing Dynamic System Call
We choose to use Microsoft Detours library [72] to implement our dynamic system call
capturing system. Detours is a library freely available from Microsoft Research. Detours
hooks arbitrary user code onto Win32 API call. It provides API call to modify the first several
instructions of the target function with a “jmp” instruction. “jmp” diverts the execution
flow of Win32 API to the user supplied code. However, the replaced instructions of the target
function are not lost. It is saved by Detours to a newly appended section of the executable
code. Inside the user supplied codes, the user can optionally invoke the original version of
the system call through a trampoline function. In current Detours implementation, every
application using Detours should include “detoured.dll”, which is easy to be detected by
application. However, “detoured.dll” file is a marker that guides Microsoft technical support
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Figure 5.1: System Call Trace
personnel and tools by helping them quickly determine that a process has been altered by
the Detours package [72]. It is not a limitation inherent to Detours.
In our implementation, we capture the following information along with the name of
system call:
(i) Return address of the system call and the stack trace information
(ii) Inputs and outputs of system call
(iii) Timestamp of the system call
We capture the system call information before and after the real system call invocation.
Before the invocation, we capture the program stack at the moment of system call invocation,
input parameter and time stamp. After the invocation, we capture return value and output
parameters. Figure 5.1 shows one system call trace we have captured. Every line in figure 5.1
represents a captured system call. It starts with a time stamp, followed by call stacks, and
then the name of system and its parameters.
Stack information refers to the active stack frames of the running program. In figure 5.2.b,
we show stack layout for a typical program. The program itself is listed in figure 5.2.a. Each
time we invoke a function, we first push the return address, which is the address of next
instruction in the calling function, onto the stack. Next we save EBP, which is the frame
point of previous function, in the stack. EBP will be used as frame point of the new function.
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Figure 5.2: Stack Structure
EBP remains constant during the execution of function body. From the current EBP, we
can infer position of local variable, saved return IP and saved EBP on stack. Especially,
from the current EBP, we can get position of EBP of the calling function. Thus, EBP of all
calling functions form a chain. In figure 5.2, we show the state of stack right after we invoke
“syscall” in the program. From the current EBP, we can get EBP of all invoking functions,
which are funB, funA and main. Because return IP address of the function is right above
saved EBP, we can get return IP address of the function easily. We use the return IP address
as the identification of a function.
However, not all programs are well-behaved especially for some malicious software. Some-
times they do not put function base pointer onto the stack. If this happens, our program
cannot extract correct stack trace information. In this case, we only capture the stack
information up to the point where we can.
5.3 Structural System Call Diagram
The goal to construct a structural system call diagram is to visualize the system call
trace in a natural way. System call trace contains the information about dynamic system
calls of the program. However, system call trace contains repetitions. In our statistics, more
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than 80% of the contents of the system call trace are simple repetitions. Also, system call
traces are simple chronicle logs and do not break into blocks. This sequential form of system
call is not intuitive for human to read.
Our target diagram is a control flow graph like visual structure. To build a structural
system call diagram, we proceed as follows:
(i) Break sequential system call trace into natural blocks
(ii) Remove repetition
(iii) Connect different blocks with edges which represent the control flow
(iv) For each block, list all system call information
(v) For each edge, calculate the number of times that execution follow this path
5.3.1 Generating Blocks
First, we describe the algorithm to break sequential system call trace into natural blocks.
We divide this process into two steps. First, we divide the system calls into functions. Then
we further break each function into several blocks.
5.3.1.1 Identifying Functions
In section 5.2, we have discussed that calling function of a system call can be identified
by stack trace information. We can get the calling chain from that system call all the way
up to the main function. Our goal here is to identify system calls belonging to the same
function from system call trace.
In figure 5.3.a, we demonstrate two simple functions, funcA and FuncB. FuncB invokes
FuncA and FunA invoke three system calls respectively. If we run FunB, we get a stack
trace of three system calls in figure 5.3.b. Although the immediate return IP of the system
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Figure 5.3: Identifying Functions
calls are different (A1, A2, A3 in figure 5.3.a), the second level return IP are the same (B
in figure 5.3.a). From this example, we can infer that if the second level return IPs of two
system calls are the same, then they belong to the same function (figure 5.3.c). We use
return IP to identify that function. However, this is not absolutely true. We will discuss
exceptions to this rule later.
On the other hand, return IP is a dynamic concept which is not perfect to describe a
function. Even if the return IPs are different, they could be different invocations of the
same function. Figure 4 shows an example. In this example, we identify two different
functions, B1 and B2. However, FuncA and FuncB are merely two different invocations of
the same function, FuncA. We use a heuristics to address this. If the address spaces of two
different function identified by return ID overlap, then the two functions are the same. This
heuristics cannot address all situations though. We only observed a partial address space of
the function inside system call trace. Even if observed address spaces of two functions do
not overlap, they could be the same function as well.
In sum, here are the criteria we are using to organize system calls into functions:
(i) If two system calls have the same second level return IP, we consider these two system
calls are inside the same function
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Figure 5.4: Merge Functions
(ii) For any two different function blocks derived by 1, if the address spaces overlap, then
we merge these two function blocks
Now, let us discuss exceptions to rule 1. Some programs use function point variables
in their program. Figure 5.5 shows an example. FuncA1 and FuncA2 are two different
functions. However, by using a function point variable, we invoke FuncA1 and FuncA2 at
the same location. In this case, even second level return IP are the same, we are invoking
different functions.
There is no simple solution to solve these problems. System call trace only contains
partial information of the program structure. We cannot get everything from it.
In addition, system call trace is not perfect. As we have already discussed before, some-
times we cannot get correct program stack. This adds extra complexity and incompleteness
to the problem.
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Figure 5.5: Functions Point Variables
5.3.1.2 Breaking Functions
To visualize the system call trace and make the structural system call trace graph useful,
the size of the block is very important. If the size of the block is too large, it is hard for
human to read. If it is too small, then we will end up with too many blocks. In the function
level, the number of system calls for each function is irregular. Some function contains many
system calls while other functions do not contain any system call. For a large function, we
need to further split it; for smaller functions, we need to merge them.
The splitting process is based on the repetitions and branches of system calls inside
system call traces. Ideally, one block should consist of sequential instructions and there is
no control flow transfer instructions or control flow transfer destination from outside in the
between. However, there is no explicit control flow transfer instruction in the system call
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trace. We will use the repetition of the system call to infer the presence of the control flow
transfer instructions.
Here are several observations we shall take advantage of when we traverse through the
system call log one system call by one system call.
(i) If the current system call starts a repetition, then first occurrence of this system call
should start a new block, since it is a destination of a control flow transfer operation
(loop). Because it is a repeated system call, surely we need to remove subsequent
occurrence
(ii) If the repeated segment in the system call trace branches into a block other than the
current block, then we can infer that there is a control flow transfer instruction in the
between. We shall split the current block and the splitting point is right before this
branch
Figure 5.6 illustrates the splitting process. Suppose we have system calls in our trace
shows in figure 5.6.a. From the system call trace, we can infer that there exists a control
flow transfer instruction from GetProcAddr back to LoadLibrary. So we divide this block
into two.
From the system call trace, we can infer that there exists a control flow transfer instruction
from GetProcAddr back to LoadLibrary. So we divide this block into two.
On the contrary, some blocks are too small. We need a reverse process to merge several
blocks into one. The heuristics we use to merge different blocks include:
(i) If a parent function invokes a serial of functions, and all these functions contain small
number of system calls, we can leave parent function and remove all child function and
move all system calls to the parent function.
(ii) Inside a function, at the block level, if a block contains very few system calls, and if
there is only one incoming edge (except for self-loop), and all the set of its downstream
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Figure 5.6: Splitting into blocks
Figure 5.7: Merge blocks
blocks are the subset of the parent nodes’ downstream blocks, then we can merge the
block into its upstream block and maintain the logic correctness. Figure 4 is a case
which we can merge the block to its upstream block
5.3.2 Constructing Graph
Now we finish dividing the system call trace into blocks, and removing repetition. Fol-
lowing the system call trace, we can add edges to the block according to the execution flow
revealed by the system call trace. We also accumulate the weights of every edge. Every time
control flow follows this edge, we add weights by 1.
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5.3.3 Generating Block Description
The remaining work is to put the contents inside each block. The questions we need to
answer here are:
(i) What is the order of system calls inside a block
(ii) How to summarize the parameters of each system call
For question 1, we have two ways to order system call:
(i) Sequential order as appeared in system call trace
(ii) Sort the return address of the system call
Since the goal of our structural system call diagram is to visualize the dynamic system
call trace, the sequential order of system calls inside the system call log is more important
and understandable, so we pick the first criteria. The system call appear first in system call
trace will be the first in the block.
Each system call can be invocated several times with different parameters. In our visu-
alizer implementation, we focus on string parameter only. The most important parameters
include filename, directory name, registry key name, function name, etc. If there are differ-
ent invocations for a system call, we list all string parameters. Also, some string parameters
are very long, such as absolute path to a system file. In these cases, we use partial string
instead of full string.
5.4 Structural System Call Visualizer
Based on the approach we discuss in the last section, we have built a structural system
call diagram visualizer based on system call trace. The visualize will first execute the target
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program, extract system call trace, then build structural system call diagram and present it
to the user.
To avoid excessive waiting time, we only capture system call up to 10 seconds even if the
target program is not finished. Because of this, we cannot capture the complete system call
trace in many cases. However, most malicious software will reveal its malicious behavior in
the beginning part of its execution. We believe 10 seconds is a good compromise between
effectiveness and efficiency.
5.5 Smart System Call Signature
In this section, we present an application of structural system call diagram. We build
a smart signature based on system call trace and use this signature to detect a family of
malicious software.
The prevailing technique in the anti-virus industry is based on signature matching. The
detection mechanism searches for a binary signature pattern that identifies a particular
virus or strain of viruses. However, through constant code rewriting, polymorphism [2]
and metamorphism [3], malicious software writer can create a new variance of the same
malicious software family quickly. The old signature cannot capture the new variance of
malicious software.
Malicious software is able to change its appearance easily. However, the behavior of the
malicious software of the same family is quite similar. Behavior of software is revealed by
a serial of system calls. This is why we use system call as signature to detect malicious
software family.
Structural system call diagram breaks system call traces into natural blocks reflecting
the structure of the program. We use system calls inside a block as signature.
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Figure 5.8: Profile Hidden Markov Model
In this section, we discuss the profile hidden Markov model (PHMM) [95] and how to
derive the system call signature manually. In next section, we will describe an automatic
process to derive the system call signature.
Using our visualizer, security experts are able to compare the similarities and differences
between different variances of the same malicious software family through structural system
call diagram. They will derive the most prominent block and use this block as a signature.
However, malicious software changes its code for every variation and there may be slight
difference between variations. In this sense, we do not use exact match, instead, we build
a smart signature using PHMM. Our smart signature allows insertion, deletion or mutation
for one or more positions inside system call signature.
PHMM is a specific form of hidden Markov model (HMM) and is widely used in bioin-
formatics for sequence analysis [95]. In simple words, profile hidden Markov model is a
probabilistic model to represent a serial of sequences. For an unknown sequence, we can
use existing PHMM to score it. The result shows the probability that the sequence being
generated by the PHMM.
Figure 5.8 shows a diagram of PHMM. The PHMM starts from start (S) state and ends at
terminal (T) state. The core of PHMM between beginning (B) and ending (E) states consists
of the matching (M) states, insertion (I) states, and deletion (D) states. A matching state
(e.g., M1-M3 in Figure 5.8) represents a fairly stable system call. Each matching state has
a deletion state (e.g., D1-D3 in figure 5.8) associated with it, allowing the deletion of the
matching state (or position). Each matching state except for the last one also has an insertion
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state (e.g., I1-I2 in figure 5.8) associated with it, allowing the insertion of additional positions
after it. Transitions between I and D states are not allowed. N and C are two special states
to accommodate additional insertions before and after the conserved regions of a family of
sequences, which allows local alignment between a sequence and the PHMM (i.e. matching
a part of a sequence against the core of PHMM between state B and state E). Another
interesting feature of the PHMM is that there is a transition from B to each M state, and
a transition from each M state directly to E state. These transitions make it possible to
match only a part of the model against a sequence, allowing local alignment with respect to
the PHMM. Each M, I, N, C states has an emission probability vector derived from input
sequences. In our case, every state emits a system call of different category with a specific
distribution.
When we score a structural system call block against the PHMM, we will get a log-odds
score. It is the logarithm of the ratio between the probability that the block is generated by
the PHMM and the probability that it is generated randomly.
In our first experiment, we build PHMM from one manually picked system call block.
For every system call inside the block, we assign a matching state. We use a fixed value for
all transition probabilities and emission probabilities for simplicity. The PHMM we built is
able to identify the structural system call block we pick, and the system call block similar
to it, even if there are some insertions, deletions or mutations.
For every unknown program, we first run the program, capture system call traces, and
then generate structural system call diagram for that unknown program. For each block, we
score it using derived PHMM. If we find any block similar to our signature, we consider it a
variance of the malicious software family.
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5.6 Automatic Smart Signature Generation
Using our visualizer, security experts are able to visualize and analyze system call trace
easier. However, derive a structural system call block signature is still time consuming. To
this end, we designed a mechanism to derive system call signature automatically from a
collection of malicious software from the same family.
Malicious software signature should have the following characters:
(i) It is very rare in benign code
(ii) It exists in many variances in the malicious software family
We design an algorithm to generate system call signature automatically. The input is a
family of malicious software code and a pool of benign software. The algorithm consists of
two separate steps:
(i) We first generate a benign system call block database which consists of all system
call blocks exist inside our benign software pool. To do that, we need to construct
structural system call diagram for every benign code in the pool. After that, we
generate structural system call diagram for every malicious code. For each block inside
structural system call diagram, we build a PHMM and score it against each system
call block in our benign system call block database. If the number of matches exceeds
a threshold, we mark this block as benign and do not use it as malicious software
signature
(ii) The remaining system call blocks of malicious software family are candidates for signa-
ture. Our goal is to find the system call block which exists in most malicious software.
We first construct structural system call diagram for each malicious code, build PHMM
for each system call block. We try to find similar block in other malicious code. So for
each PHMM, we score it against blocks of all other malicious code. If we find a similar
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block in one malicious code, it means this signature is able to capture that malicious
code. We maintain a counter for each signature candidate. The signature candidate
captures the most number of malicious code is the signature we choose
5.7 Experimental Results
5.7.1 Visualizer
We first use our visualizer to generate structural system call diagram for both benign
and malicious code.
Figure 5.9 shows the structural system call diagram for a benign program “charmap.exe”.
From the diagram, we can see that the executable start with reading profile information,
and then open several Unicode extension files. Instead of reading hundreds of lines of system
call traces, structural system call diagram is much succinct and easier to read.
Figure 5.10 shows a similar structural system call diagram for a malicious program “SD-
Bot.afz”.
5.7.2 Dataset
To experiment on system call signature, we choose two bots families: SDBot and RBot.
Botnet [13] is malicious software characterized by infecting a large number of zombies to form
a malicious network. Each victim computer is called a bot. We choose to use bot code in
our experiment because we can find a large number of variances for each bot family. We find
935 different variances of SDBot and 1249 different variances of RBot from vx heaven [13].
Some of those variances are not runnable on our computer. We use the runnable variances
only as our dataset which include 595 SDBot and 1055 Rbot.
We use commercial antivirus software to scan our malware dataset. Table 5.1 shows the
result virus scanner by three commercial antivirus software. It is no surprise that antivirus
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Figure 5.9: Structural system call diagram for “charmap.exe”
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Figure 5.10: Structural system call diagram for “SdBot.afz”
software capture most of the malware samples since they are known malware and be around
for times. None of our samples is missed by all three virus scanners we have tested.
We also randomly pick 878 benign executables which consist of Windows system exe-
cutables, commercial executables and open source executables as our benign dataset.
We report detection rate on the malicious software dataset and the false positive rate on
the benign dataset as the criteria to evaluate the performance of our smart signature.
5.7.3 Manual Signature Generation
We first manually analyze structural system call diagram using our visualizer for SDBot.
By carefully comparing different variances of SDBot instances, we conclude that there is a
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Table 5.1: Missed Malware by Commercial Antivirus Software
Norton Antivirus 2009 McAfee VirusScan Plus Kaspersky AntiVirus 2009
SDBot SdBot.aig SdBot.aig SdBot.jb
SdBot.dh SdBot.dh
RBot Rbot.abk Rbot.am Rbot.aek
Rbot.ael Rbot.ia
Rbot.gt
Rbot.iw
Rbot.jb
Rbot.yv
Rbot.zf
Figure 5.11: System call signature for SDBot
specific system call pattern for many of variances of SDBot family. We use that block as our
signature. Figure 5.11 shows the signature we get.
Using this system call signature, we are able to capture 222 out of 595 SDBot, or 37.3%
detection rate. The false positive rate for the signature in our benign dataset is 0.9%.
Another interesting finding is that inside the SDBot variances which cannot be captured
by our system call signature, we can still find some other system call patterns. So we
exclude SDBot we have already captured from the dataset, and run our automatic signature
generation tool again. We get a secondary system call signature (Figure 5.12) which is able
to capture another 58 SDBot variance. By using two system call signatures, our detection
rate is 47.1%, and false positive rate is 1.6%.
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Figure 5.12: Secondary system call signature for SDBot
5.7.4 Automatic Signature Generation
Next, we experiment our automatic system call signature generation tool.
We use 5-fold cross-validation [7] to evaluate the performance in this experiment. We
randomly divide the dataset into 5 subsamples of the same size. We then repeat the cross-
validation process 5 times. Every time we use one subsample as testing dataset and all other
subsamples as training dataset. Our result is the average of all 5 runs. We will generate
smart signature based on the information given by the training dataset and use it to detect
the nature of testing dataset.
The detection rate for SDBot is 37.0% and the false positive rate is 0.9%, very close to
that of manually generated signature.
We also experiment on another bot family, RBot. Use the automatic generated system
call signature, we capture 40.1% variances of RBot, and the false positive rate is 1.0%.
However, not all malicious software families can achieve similar result. We also tested
system call signature on AgoBot, the detection rate is 21.4%. The effectiveness of system
call signature depends on the character of the specific malicious software family. By using
our visualizer, we can get an impression whether or not the specific malicious software family
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shows a pattern inside system call blocks. If it does, we can extract the signature manually
or use our signature generation tool to extract the signature automatically.
5.8 PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we use the following symbols.
M average size of system call signature
N number of training malwares
B average number of blocks in a structral system call diagram
T average length of system call trace
We discuss two different aspects of system time complexity.
Decision time complexity is the time complexity to determine whether an unknown exe-
cutable is a malware or not based on an existing model. The dominant part for the decision
process is the scoring algorithm of profile hidden Markov model. It is bounded to O(M2T).
To generate system call signature automatically, we first need to generate system call
blocks. By one linear scan, we can organize system calls into different functions, which takes
O(T). We then need to compare each pair of function, if their address spaces overlap, we
merge them. Suppose the average number of functions is F, this process takes O(F2). Merge
and Splitting is performed recursively, however, we put a limit on the number of iterations.
To find a candidate block to split, we need to scan all the blocks for the size exceeding the
threshold, which takes O(B). For each splitting, we need to traverse all the system calls
inside the block which is O(T/B). So the time complexity for splitting is O(c*B*T/B) =
O(T), where c is the limit we put on number of iterations. For merging, it also takes O(B)
to search merge candidate pairs. The actual merge include merging system calls inside both
block, which is O(T/B). So the time complexity for merging is O(c*B*T/B) = O(T) as well.
Adding all above together, we have O(T) +O(F2)+O(T) ≤O(T2) to generate a signature.
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It takes O(M) to build profile hidden Markov model for that signature using our approach.
Altogether, we have O(B*N) blocks. We will score each block against all other O(B*N)
blocks.
The overall time complexity to generate a system call signature is bounded by O(T2)*
O(M)*O(B*N) *O(B*N) = O(MT2B2N2).
5.9 Conclusion
In this section, we illustrate a structural dynamic system call graph and use it to detect
a family of malicious software automatically. We focus only on the dynamic system call
captured from runtime, and then create a graph structure similar to control flow graph.
Use this structural system call diagram we are able to visualize and analyze an executable
efficiently.
We then use system call block inside structural system call diagram as a natural boundary
and generate system call signature. We use both manual approach and automatic approach
to extract system call signature from a malicious software family. Our experimental result
shows that this system call signature is effective in detecting some variances in a malicious
software family.
Detection rate for system call approach is low, combining system call and dynamic in-
struction sequence may provide a better solution. We will investigate it in our future work.
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION
In this research, we have built a dynamic execution environment. We can run arbitrary
program inside the dynamic execution environment with control. Based on this dynamic
execution environment, we have proposed two novel malicious code detection approaches:
(i) Mining dynamic instruction sequences to detect Win32 viruses.
(ii) Utilizing structural system call diagram to detect a family of malicious software.
There are limitations in our approaches. The experiments utilize a finite number of
instructions or system calls, hence will not detect any malicious code hooked in the remaining
part of the executable code. In addition, since we follow one possible executable path, it is
possible to miss malicious section of code in our experiment.
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